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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
For a long time, environmental issues were neglected in research on economic growth.
Not until the Club of Rome published its famous work "The Limits to Growth"
(Meadows et al., 1972), were environmental problems – first in terms of exhaustible
resources, later in terms of pollution – integrated into neoclassical growth models.
Although it was not considered in neoclassic theory, the environment is indeed an im-
portant factor for economic growth. It provides plenty of services to human existence
not captured by income: It is a source of renewable and non-renewable resources for
economic activities (e.g. fossil fuels as oil, nourishments as fish) and it takes the
function of a sink for undesired by-products as waste and pollution. Hence, the envi-
ronment does not only affect the economy, it is also affected by economic activities.
Furthermore, economic growth and its repercussions on the environment are inex-
tricable. Since economic activities often produce ill spin-offs, they tend to intensify
many environmental problems such as air and water pollution, loss of biodiversity
or hazardous extraction of resources (Egli, 2005b). Thus, the extinction of single
species may affect the stability of the corresponding ecosystem (Hiering, 2003; Levin
and Pacala, 2003), climate change may cause lower crop yields and rising sea levels
may harm people through malnutrition and permanent displacement (Stern, 2007).
Despite its negative impacts on the environment, economic growth is still important
itself. Due to economic development, living standards over the last two centuries
have increased tremendously (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Egli, 2005b). However,
since "The Limits of Growth", the durability of economic growth has been questioned
due to finite resources and a restricted carrying capacity of the earth.
Motivated by the long-term implications of the limitations on economic growth and
development, the Brundtland Report of the United Nations World Commission on
Environment and Development (World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment, 1988) started the discussion about sustainable development. It defines sus-
tainable development as follows: "Sustainable development meets the needs of the
present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs." (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1988, p. 43)
In economic terms, this definition can be described as the "non-declining welfare
between generations" (Egli, 2005b, p. 18).
This definition in hand, a dispute about the the possibility of sustainable growth
arose. Growth pessimists on the one hand state that economic growth can never be
sustainable (e.g. Daly, 1999, 2006; Bartlett, 2006), whereas growth optimists on the
other hand claim that growth actually may be sustainable (e.g. Beckerman, 1999).
Spangenberg (2001) argues that sustainable growth is only possible if the resource
productivity increases at higher rate than economic growth. However, the discussion
has not yet come to an end.
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The finding of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) by Grossman and Krueger
(1993) changed the ongoing discussion dramatically. They found for several pollutants
that environmental degradation is first increasing with income before the level of
pollution decreases with higher income. This non-monotonic relationship between
pollution and income suggests that with growing income the environmental pressure
decreases in the long run. Thus, the EKC became a symbol for sustainable growth.
So far theoretical analysis of the EKC is scarce and therefore the underlying basis is still
unknown. It is this gap I will address through investigation of the EKC with respect
to learning by doing in the abatement sector. The goal of this study is to analyse
whether the EKC is a real symbol for sustainable growth or only a data phenomenon.
Furthermore, learning by doing in abatement is discussed as the main drive of the
EKC, and the impacts on the turning point are analysed since this information may
help to alleviate environmental pressure.
To do so, I first present the empirical foundations of the EKC in Chapter 2. I elaborate
on, which kind of data has been used as well as the applied estimation techniques,
the results and the associated criticism. I find that the EKC is found mainly for
local flow pollutants. Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical explanations of the EKC
and I review, critically, the five main basic approaches. In Chapter 4, I introduce
learning by doing in abatement as the actual reason for the hump-shaped pattern.
I also set up a dynamic one-sector model following Brock and Taylor (2003). In
this model, abatement is zero until the marginal disutility of pollution exceeds the
marginal utility of capital. Then abatement sets in which reduces pollution and the
EKC arises. Furthermore, I discuss the turning point of this model and how single
parameters affect it. In Chapter 5, a more general approach is examined. I argue that
learning by doing in abatement may be modelled through increasing returns to scale
as in Andreoni and Levinson (2001). Following Egli and Steger (2007) I demonstrate
that increasing returns to scale in abatement is a sufficient assumption for creating the
EKC in a dynamic environment. Unlike Brock and Taylor (2003), the model points
out the importance of environmental policy for the relationship between economic
growth and environmental degradation. In Chapter 6 I test the validity of the models
by comparing their suitability to other moments concerning economic growth and the
environment. Moreover, the increasing returns to scale approach faces problems with
the possibility of negative pollution in the long run. These can be solved by assuming
that the economies of scale fade away. Chapter 7 concludes this contribution.
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2 The Environmental Kuznets Curve
2.1 The Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis
The relationship between pollution and income was the topic of several studies towards
the end of the 20th century and has become a "stylised fact" of environmental and re-
source economics (e.g. Stokey, 1998). In these studies - here should be mentioned the
seminal contributions of the World Bank (1992), Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992)
and Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995) - the researchers found a characteristic
pattern that describes the relationship between pollution and income per capita for
various pollutants depicted in Figure 1: At low levels of income, pollution of these
substances rises, while at higher income levels the slope turns around and pollution
declines with subsequent income growth.
Later on, this shape of an inverted U was named the Enironmental Kuznets Curve
(EKC) for its similar shape to the Kuznets Curve which describes an inverted U-
shape relationship between the levels of income and income inequality (Kuznets,
1955). Both curves are based on the idea that with the process of economic growth,
different measures of quality of life first deteriorate before they improve again at a
later time (Pearson, 1994, p. 201). The EKC hypothesis postulates that pollution
initially rises with increasing income but might decline if growth continues long enough
such that the relationship between income and pollution takes the form of an inverted
U (Deacon and Norman, 2006). In more general terms, the behaviour of pollution
at rising income can be called a pollution-income relationship (PIR), and the special
case of an hump-shaped PIR is the EKC (Lieb, 2003, p. 1).
Usually, many environmentalists consider the impact of economic growth to be in-
evitably negative for the environment (Cole, 1999), which is synonymously to a mono-
tonically increasing PIR. This beliefe includes that growth must sooner or later halt as
the capacity of the world to assimilate pollution is limited (López, 1994) unless there
is pollution-saving technological progress that allows production to increase without
causing additional harm to the environment (Stokey, 1998).
The findings of the EKC by Grossman and Krueger (1993) and subsequently many
other authors contradict completely the assumptions of the negative impacts of
growth. They suggest that pollution would be only a transitional phenomenon during
the growth process of an economy. According to the EKC, economic growth could
be a panacea against environmental degradation, as pollution might be decoupled
from the growth process. Therefore, there could be no conflict between economic
growth and environmental degradation, because "only economic growth can provide
the resources with which to tackle environmental problems" (Cole, 1999, p.91).
This again would imply that environmental policy is not effective at all and can be
omitted. Hence, any government should be interested rather in growing rapidly and
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degradation
income
Figure 1: The Environmental Kuznets Curve
ignore environmental regulation. However, this is quite a stark statement derived from
a simplistic model explaining a complex problem. Such an interpretation might be
rather "false and pernicious nonsense" (Ayres, 1995, p. 97). Therefore, it is important
to understand the underlying characteristics and principles of the EKC before drawing
such far reaching conclusions for public policy (Andreoni and Levinson, 2001).
In several studies the estimated results provide not only a inverted U-shaped PIR
but an N-shaped. This means that at the first stage of income growth, pollution
increases, subsequently follow by a period when environmental quality improves with
economic growth before the relationship reverses again and growth causes further
deterioration. Such results imply that environmental pressure and economic growth
are actually not de-linked, or at least that the decoupling effects are not persistent
(de Bruyn and Heintz, 1999).
2.2 Pollution Data
Although there are data records on pollution available, for instance the Global En-
vironmental Monitoring System (GEMS) databank collected by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), the
available data contains various problems for estimating the PIR. For example, reliable
and comparable data for pollution is scarce. For a vast number of countries, data
is absent. In addition to its scarcity, data from developing countries is "often con-
sidered unreliable" (Auffhammer et al., 2000). This is problematic for cross-country
estimations as the data might not be able to represent reality and hence the esti-
mation results are useless. Furthermore, measuring methods vary across countries
and measurement sites might be unrepresentative, making comparisons impossible
(Shafik, 1994). Also, sufficiently long time series are missing since the first data on
pollutants was collected in the 1960s (Lieb, 2003, p.4). Finally, many dimensions of
environmental quality such as soil erosion, desertification or biodiversity loss are not
recorded, therefore estimations cannot be calculated for them (Cole, 1999). Ergo,
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research is focused on pollutants with available data such as air or water pollutants
(Lieb, 2003).
Pollution can be measured in terms of concentrations and in terms of emissions.
Several surveys apply concentrations of pollutants (Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992;
Grossman and Krueger, 1993, 1995; Panayotou, 1997), while other take emissions
into account (Selden and Song, 1994; Hilton and Levinson, 1998; Stern and Com-
mon, 2001). However, both types of measurement have advantages and disadvan-
tages. Concentrations are more accurate than emissions, because they are ascertained
directly with scientific methods, whereas emissions are not measured but constructed
from estimates of fuel use and emission coefficients for various types of fuel (de Bruyn,
2000; Auffhammer and Carson, 2008). However, because of the construction from
fuel combustion data, emissions are directly connected to economic activity. By con-
trast, concentrations may measure the local impact on the environment, but they are
not related to economic activity (Lieb, 2003).
According to de Bruyn (2000), concentrations should not be used when linked them
to economic variables such as gross domestic product (GDP). One of the reasons
for this is that concentrations are obtained from specific locations such that the
pollution variable depends on local effects. On the contrary, GDP is a nationwide
variable. Combining them might cause several problems. Firstly, income per capita
varies between local area where concentration is measured and the national average,
but the divergence is not constant. Therefore, the site of measurement cannot be
representative of the whole economy. Secondly, the area of data collection is a
small geographical area such that a reallocation of industry is immediately notable
in the data, even if the factory moved only a short distance: This would mean lower
local pollution concentrations, the pollution output however would remain the same.
Thirdly, climatic conditions may become explanatory variables. Rain, for instance,
reduces the travel distance of various air pollutants in the atmosphere. Ergo, in wet
seasons concentrations may be higher or lower than usual, depending if the area has
usually a high or a low output of pollution.1 Therefore, pollution should be measured
in terms of emissions to make a reasonable link to economic activity.
2.3 Estimation Techniques
Various econometric techniques are used in the EKC literature. However, the domi-
nant estimation technique is the estimation of
1Controlling for these phenomena is actually possible but not advisable since it makes the model
very large. However, a larger size of the model may cause multicollinearity (Verbeek, 2004, p.42).
Also, forecasting according to the Box-Jenkins approach requires small size models (Hamilton, 1994,
p.109).
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Pit = αit + β1Yit + β2Y 2it + β3Y 3it + β4Xit + it, (1)
where P is pollution in terms of emissions per capita or concentrations, αit is a
constant, Y is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, i indicates the country or
the monitoring station, t is a time index,X represents additional explanatory variables,
βk indicates the relative importance of the explanatory variable k and  is the error
term (de Bruyn and Heintz, 1999).2 The estimation approaches are discussed in detail
in Lieb (2003) and will not be further elaborated in this survey.
The presented estimation model allows for seven distinguished forms of the PIR: A
monotonically rising or falling PIR, an inverted U-shaped PIR representing the EKC,
a U-shaped relationship opposite the EKC, an N-shape where pollution is first rising,
then falling and finally rising again, an inverted N-shaped relationship where pollution
first decreases, then increases and decreases in the end, and an insignificant or flat
PIR. Therefore, the EKC is only one among many possibilities (de Bruyn and Heintz,
1999) which explains the various results across studies.
Note that (1) is a reduced form that uses income as a catch-all variable (Panayotou,
1997). Therefore, it is impossible to tell if other factors that are influenced by income,
for instance environmental regulation, structural change or technology, cause the EKC
shaped PIR. In order to identify the impact of different effects on pollution, several
scholars introduced decomposition analysis.
Grossman and Krueger (1993), for example, suggested to distinguish between the
scale effect, the composition effect and the technique effect. The scale effect shows
how ceteris paribus higher income affects pollution. Usually it is assumed that emis-
sions increase with production, as higher economic activity implies higher resource
use and hence more waste. The composition effect indicates the influence of the
economy’s structure on emissions. Depending on the composition of the economy,
the composition effect might boost or lower pollution. It will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 3.4. The technique effect illustrates the impact of technological
change. It is expected to be pollution reducing since better technology means lower
emissions per unit of input in the production process.
One problem of the decomposition analysis is that in many countries output data
and fuel use data - one component for estimating the technique effect - are collected
on a different sectoral basis. This means that the data are not comparable and the
decomposition analysis is impossible to implement (Stern, 2004).
2In some studies, the researchers drop the cubic term. This however is too beneficial to the EKC
hypothesis. Including the cubic term on the other hand allows for both an inverted U-shaped and
monotonically rising PIR (Lieb, 2003).
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2.4 Estimation Results
Various types of pollutants are investigated in a vast amount of surveys. These studies
focus especially on air pollutants, but also river pollutants and municipal waste are
under study.3 The group of air pollutants contains sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen
oxide (NOX), carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), suspended particulate
matter (SPM) and volatile organic compounds (VOC).
One can arrange these pollutants based upon their durability, into long-lasting stock
pollutants and short-living flow pollutants. To the flow pollutants belong river pol-
lutants (RP), SO2, NOX, CO, SPM, and VOC. Although all of these are actually
stock pollutants, their lifetime is very short and thus they can be considered as flow
pollutants: The atmospheric lifetime of SO2 varies between one to four days, NOX
between two to five days,4 and CO between one and three months (Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change, 1996, p.76). The lifetime of VOC in the atmosphere
is a fraction of days or months (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001,
p.257), SPM are washed out by precipitation and thus have a short durability (Liu
and Lipták, 2000, p.34). River pollutants flow with the stream such that concentra-
tions quickly decline when emissions are reduced (Lieb, 2004, p.484). In contrast,
CO2 has a distinctly longer life time of two to four years (Liu and Lipták, 2000), and
municipal waste accumulates in waste disposal sites. Therefore, these two pollutants
are considered as stock pollutants (Lieb, 2004).
The results obtained provide evidence that the EKC holds for flow pollutants, whereas
the PIR for stock pollutants is monotonically rising (Lieb, 2004). This is illustrated
in Table 2.4. For all considered flow pollutants, the studies find very often an EKC-
shaped PIR and a few times an N-shaped PIR. For stock pollutants the result are
the opposite: Municipal waste is growing constantly, for CO2 the evidence is mixed.
Nevertheless, in most of the surveys on CO2 a monotonically rising PIR is found.
Hence we can conclude that the EKC is a phenomenon of short living flow pollutants.
2.5 Critiques
Although the initial findings regarding the EKC gained acceptance during the last 20
years, they are not without criticism. Objections are based on contradictory results
and estimation errors. Harbaugh et al. (2002) for example suggest that the pollution-
income relationship is less robust than previously thought. They re-estimated the
model of Grossman and Krueger (1995) which demonstrated evidence for the EKC.
3There are also investigations in other dimensions of environmental quality as lack of water or
deforestation. However, these do not show any clear picture and therefore they are not discussed.
Their results are provided in Lieb (2003) for further interest.
4In all EKC studies, SO2 and NOX are considered as pure air pollutants. This contradicts of
course the fact that they are also stock pollutants that acidify soils, wetlands or lakes.
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Table 1: Empirical results for the PIR of several pollutants
Flow pollutants Stock pollutants
SO2 SPM NOX CO RP VOC Waste CO2
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) _ _ ∼ ↗ ↗
Grossman and Krueger (1993) _ ∼
Selden and Song (1994) _ ∼ _ is
Shafik (1994) _ _ ∼ ↗ ↗
Grossman (1995) ∼ _ _ _
Grossman and Krueger (1995) ∼ _ _
Carson et al. (1997) _ _ _ _ _ _
Cole et al. (1997) _ _ _ _ _ ↗ ↗
Moomaw and Unruh (1997) ∼
Panayotou (1997) ∼
Roberts and Grimes (1997, p.192) ↗
Kaufmann et al. (1998) ∼
Schmalensee et al. (1998) _
Scruggs (1998) _ _
Torras and Boyce (1998) ∼ _ _
Wu (1998) _
Barrett and Graddy (2000) ∼ _ _
Cavlovic et al. (2000) _ _ _ _ _ ↗
Dinda et al. (2000) _ ∼
Hettige et al. (2000) _
List and Gerking (2000) _ _
Perrings and Ansuageti (2000) _ ↗
Halkos and Tsionas (2001) ↗
Heil and Selden (2001) ↗
Roca et al. (2001) ∼ is ↗
Stern and Common (2001) _ / ↗ ↗
Hill and Magnani (2002) _ _ _ / ↗
Friedl and Getzner (2003) ∼
Millimet et al. (2003) _ _
Egli (2005b) is _ _ is is is
Kunnas and Myllyntaus (2007) _ ∼ ↗
Halicioglu (2009) ↗
Fodha and Zaghdoud (2010) _ ↗
Iwata et al. (2011) ↗
Note: SPM – suspended particulate matter; RP – river pollution; VOC – volatile organic compounds;
_ – EKC;↗ – PIR monotonically rising or the turning point is out of the sample; ∼ – N-shaped PIR
(first rising, then falling, in the end rising again); is – insignificant; _/↗ – results from different
estimations.
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However, they used data revised by WHO and UNEP and adjusted by more monitoring
stations and years. The results are impressive, since they reversed Grossman and
Krueger’s findings for sulphur dioxide and smoke, "two of the three (...) [pollutants
that] exhibit the most dramatic inverse U-shaped patterns in the World Bank’s report
and in Grossman and Krueger" (Harbaugh et al., 2002, p. 541). Therefore they
conclude, "for these pollutants, the available empirical evidence cannot be used to
support either the proposition that economic growth helps the environment or the
proposition that it harms the environment" (Harbaugh et al., 2002, p. 549). Taking
this contradiction into account, it is important to examine, whether the findings of
the EKC are a generally valid result for the PIR or if it is just a special case.
Also the traditional estimation technique of (1) is exposed to criticism. Stern (2004)
summarises the critical categories in simultaneity, heteroskedasticity, omitted variable
bias and contegration issues. Additionally, Lieb (2003) identifies problems regarding
multicollinearity, lagged effects on the functional form of the estimation model and
the lack of homogeneity across analysed countries.
Simultaneity bias arises if the explanatory variable affects and is affected by the
depending variable. For example, pollution can reduce harvests or fish catches (Mc-
Connell, 1997), which are part of the production of the economy. In case of si-
multaneity, the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations are biased and
inconsistent (Stern et al., 1996). However, since there is no evidence found when
testing for simultaneity (e.g. Cole et al., 1997; List and Gerking, 2000), both Stern
(2004) and Lieb (2003) conclude that simultaneity is not a relevant critique.
Heteroskedasticity describes the case when the means of error terms are uncorrelated,
but the variance varies. Given this, the OLS estimator is still unbiased but inefficient
since the standard errors are incorrect which leads to misspecified significance values.
This problem is frequently encountered in cross-sectional models (Verbeek, 2004,
p. 82-83). Primarily discussed by Stern et al. (1996), other surveys found that
adjusting for heteroskedasticity improves the estimation results (Schmalensee et al.,
1998; Stern, 2002).
Another possibility that model misspecification falsifies the results arises from omitted
variable bias. Stern and Common (2001) compiled several significant results that
support the existence of omitted variable bias. Such bias leads to incorrect estimation
results as relevant variables are excluded from the model (Verbeek, 2004, p. 55-56).
Several studies find evidence for cointegration (e.g. Koop and Tole, 1999; Perman
and Stern, 2003) which gives rise to doubts as to whether the results of the EKC
model are based on econometric misspecifications (Stern, 2004).
Stern (2004) also claims that the existence of cointegration questions the estimation
results. Cointegration means that all variables have stochastic trends. When coin-
tegration is present, the conventional significance measurements are unreliable for
distinguishing between long run relationships and spurious regressions (Perman and
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Stern, 2003), a case where a relationship between two variables is suggested due to
trends, although it actually does not exist (Verbeek, 2004, p. 313).
Another estimation problem arises from multicollinearity, i.e. when the explanatory
variables are highly correlated. In general this is not considered a problem. If however
the correlation is very high, the estimation may be unreliable with high standard errors
and incorrect signs or magnitudes (Verbeek, 2004, p. 42-44). Also, small changes
in data can have enormous effects on the result (Greene, 2003, p. 58). In case of
the PIR, this would mean that even small measurement errors are able to change its
turning point and shape dramatically. Since the standard estimation includes income
in normal, squared and cubic form, multicollinearity is quite likely (Lieb, 2003).
Arguing that the driving forces behind the EKC are lagged effects and based in the
past, some researchers (e.g. Grossman and Krueger, 1995) added lagged average GDP
values in order to avoid estimating solely with current income. Unfortunately, both
income and average income are highly correlated as both are include in normal, square
and cubic form such that multicollinearity is found. Therefore, Lieb (2003) suggests
to estimate the PIR with lagged GDP only to include the lagged effect circumventing
multicollinearity.
Other functional forms than the cubic or quadratic polynomial estimation might be
better to describe the PIR. Some scholars apply spline functions (Schmalensee et al.,
1998; Hilton and Levinson, 1998), others a Gamma distribution as functional form
(Galeotti and Lanza, 1999) and others nonparametric approaches (Azomahou and
Van Phu, 2001). The results of the above mentioned studies, however, do not differ a
lot from the traditional polynomial estimation5 and often the polynomial is sufficiently
accurate to produce the general shape of the PIR (Lieb, 2003).
Finally, in many PIR estimations it is assumed that all countries follow the same path
and thus all countries will experience the turning point at the same level of income
(Lieb, 2003). However, empirical evidence is against such assumed homogeneity (e.g.
Koop and Tole, 1999; List and Gallet, 1999). Instead of all countries following the
same PIR, each has an individual PIR. Hence, the appropriate estimation technique
would actually be time series analysis, not cross-country analysis (Lieb, 2003).
5The differences of Azomahou and Van Phu (2001) result according to Lieb (2003) from outliers
in the data, not from the functional form.
3 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 11
3 Theoretical Explanations
Many different theories have been established in order to explain the empirical findings
of the EKC. Scholars defined various categories to structure the approaches. Pearson
(1994) sorted the literature according to two factors that affect the environmental
quality: supply and demand. The factors on the demand side are (i) the price for
environmental quality, (ii) preferences and (iii) information and its acquisition. On
the supply side, the major factors are (i) the level of population and economic activity,
(ii) structures of production and consumption, (iii) efficiencies, (iv) the use of new
materials and (v) external impacts. Kijima et al. (2010) classify the theoretical models
as static models and dynamic models, while Copeland and Taylor (2003) subdivide
into sources of growth, income effects, threshold effects and increasing returns to
abatement.
According to de Bruyn and Heintz (1999), the different theoretical explanations of
the EKC can be sorted as following:
• Behavioural changes and preferences
• Institutional changes
• Technological and organisational changes
• Structural changes
• International Reallocation
The different classifications of different authors coincide quite a lot. For example,
preferences from de Bruyn and Heintz (1999) match quite well the demand side of
Pearson (1994), while the institutional and technological changes go along with the
supply side.
Lieb (2003) uses a more detailed list. In addition to the above mentioned cate-
gories, he notes separately the substitution of pollutants, increasing returns to scale
in abatement, shocks and irreversibilities as reasons for the EKC. However, all addi-
tional points of this enumeration can be included in the listed items of de Bruyn and
Heintz. Substitution of pollutants for example belongs to technological change.
The literature review in this paper will apply most of the structure of de Bruyn and
Heintz (1999), albeit with some changes. The first subsection will refer to prefer-
ences and changes in agents’ behaviour, the second to changes in institutions and
environmental policy and the third to technological progress. Most of the established
theoretical models are more or less based on these approaches. Moreover, the first
three groups are often combined as some studies assume that technological change
is policy induced (e.g. Smulders et al., 2011).
By contrast, the last two items are rarely discussed in theoretical models, mainly due
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to the simplicity of their explanation of the EKC. Moreover, structural changes and
international reallocation are closely connected to each other and both are related
to the effects of international trade on the environment. However, it is not yet
explicitly clear why the EKC exists. Thus, the explanations should be rather treated
as propositions derived from theory, empirical work or intuitive notions (de Bruyn and
Heintz, 1999).
3.1 Behavioural Changes and Preferences
The first category suggests that with growing income the demand for environmental
quality increases too. Hence, the downturn of the EKC is caused by changes in
the demand for environmental quality. Several reasons favour this argument. Only
when basic needs, e.g. health or education, are satisfied, additional resources from
economic growth will be dedicated to combating pollution (Lieb, 2003). Eglin (1995)
states that immaterial goods such as environmental quality become more important
the higher the income is. Furthermore, rising income increases average education.
In addition, with a higher level of education, environmental awareness (Selden and
Song, 1994), fear of environmental health hazards and the concerns for a lower life
expectancy increase (Gruhl, 1978). With increasing income, wages rise such that
the opportunity costs of lost work-days due to health problems also increase (Shafik,
1994).
Changes caused by higher demand require that environmental quality is a normal
good, if not even a luxury good. Often it is cited as a luxury good, i.e. that the
income elasticity of demand for environmental quality is larger than one (Selden
and Song, 1994; Neumayer, 1998). In this case, demand for environmental quality
increases more then proportionally with growing income. However, most studies find
empirical evidence that the income elasticity is positive but smaller than one (Flores
and Carson, 1997; Kriström and Riera, 1996). Analysing the relationship between
income and environmental R&D at different income levels, Komen et al. (1997)
discover positive income elasticities, albeit elasticities that are significantly smaller
than unity.
In his static model on income elasticity of demand for environmental quality, Mc-
Connell (1997) finds that the shape of the PIR does not require income elasticity
equal to one. However, he claims that the higher the income elasticities, the slower
the increase of pollution and the faster the decline respectively. Lieb (2002) extends
the model of McConnell (1997). He disagrees with McConnell’s statement about the
connection between income elasticity and pollution. On the contrary, he demonstrates
in a static model with pollution generated by consumption that environmental quality
is necessarily a normal good if the pollution function is assumed to take a standard
functional form.
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The EKC is not just analysed with static models but also with dynamic ones. Some
dynamic approaches take up the idea that with economic growth some constraints
become non-binding, i.e. first, pollution increases with income until some threshold
is passed, after which pollution decreases anon. John and Pecchenino (1994) con-
sider an overlapping generations model in which economies with low income or high
environmental quality do not preoccupy themselves with pollution abatement. With
economic growth the environmental quality descend over time. When a certain level
of pollution is obtained, the economy starts to steer towards pollution abatement and
the quality of the environment will begin improving with economic growth. Their
model derives an inverted V-shape, a variation of the inverse-U with a sharp turn at
the breakover point where the population start to be attracted by abatement. Jaeger
(1998) creates the inverse-V from changes in consumer preferences. He assumes
that at low levels of pollution, consumers’ need for clean air is satisfied. Thus the
marginal benefits from improving environmental quality are small and consumers do
not demand clean commodities. As the turning point for pollution is reached, people
prefer clean goods such that the quality improves again.
3.2 Institutional Changes
de Bruyn and Heintz (1999) list also institutional changes as possible reason for the
appearance of the EKC. These changes comprise policy distortions and market failures
such as ill-defined property rights, subsidised energy consumption or missing internal-
isation of environmental externalities. Therefore, the rising arm of the EKC occurs
from these distortions, while the decreasing branch of the curve results from removing
the distortions and market failures. This may happen through the establishment of
appropriate property rights or environmental policies to internalise the external effect
(Panayotou, 1997).
Empirical results mainly support the hypothesis that changes in distortions and market
failures cause the EKC. For example, Dutt (2009) demonstrates in a cross-country
study that the strength of political institutions and governance lowers the emissions
of CO2. Tamazian and Rao (2010) confirm the importance of institutional quality,
as they find that institutional development has a significantly positive impact on the
environment. Culas (2007) shows that institutions for secure property rights shift the
EKC for deforestation in Latin America downwards.
Investigating the relationship between corruption and pollution, Cole (2007) finds for
SO2 and CO2 that corruption does have a positive impact on the emissions of both
pollutants. Aiming at the same target, Leitão (2010) shows for sulphur that the
degree of corruption causes the turning point of the EKC to shift to a higher income
level. Thus, the EKC shifts upwards the stronger the role of corruption is.
de Bruyn and Heintz (1999) also state that the EKC may ensue from people’s exertion
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of influence on market distortions via elections and referenda. Hence, people decide
by their votes on their country’s environmental policy. Moreover, they outline that
"institutional changes triggered by citizens’ demand for cleaner environments are
more likely to occur in democratic countries" (de Bruyn and Heintz, 1999, p. 667).
However, empirical evidence for this is mixed. Bernauer and Koubi (2009) figure
out for SO2 that the degree of democracy affects air quality positively. Shafik and
Bandyopadhyay (1992) find that the influence of political and civil rights on several
pollutants is higher, the more democratic a country is. Contrary hereto, Torras
and Boyce (1998) discover opposite results when splitting the sample of Shafik and
Bandyopadhyay into groups of countries with high- and low income. They detect that
most pollutants are lower if the country is more democratic, but has a low income.
Aslanidis and Xepapadeas (2008) develop the idea of regime switching in a simple
static model. They claim that in the real world the stringency of environmental
policy depends on the stage of development of the economy. Hence, the richer
the inhabitants (and thus the voters) of a country are, the stricter the environmental
policy becomes due to the preferences of the voters. Aslanidis and Xepapadeas expect
the slope of the PIR to be positive for lax and negative for stringent environmental
policies, hence in their model the EKC takes an inverted V-shape. Analysing the data
used by Harbaugh et al. (2002), Aslanidis and Xepapadeas confirm their model for
SO2 and smoke.
Kijima et al. (2011) investigate the EKC in a real options framework. They assume
that many myopic, local policy makers decide between tight environmental regulation
and non-regulation. Their decision depends on the trade-off between higher utility
from free business in the unregulated case and lower disutility from pollution in the
case of regulation and on the uncertainty about costs and benefits of regulation. De-
cisions are made again and again over time, thus the switching dynamics follow an
alternating renewal process. The authors find numerically that the local level of pol-
lution oscillates between the boundaries of regulation and non-regulation depending
on the current regime. However, at the aggregated level of the economy the level of
pollution evolves over time either in an inverted U-shape or in a N-shape for different
parameters. They demonstrate that the level of pollution depends on the decision of
the policy maker only, not on economic growth or utility. Hence, the EKC is not a
relationship between pollution and income but between pollution and time.
Jones and Manuelli (2001) create a model that aims explicitly at environmental policy.
In their model, the majority decides via elections about environmental policy in the
form of emission taxes or technological minimum standards in production. Countries
with low economic activity choose per capita emission taxes equal to zero. Taxation
is introduced when income has increased sufficiently for crossing the threshold; here
again an inverted V-shaped curve is derived. Similarly, the EKC may be associated
with changes in the income distribution. If environmental policy depends on the the
preferences of the median voter and if environmental quality is a normal good, then a
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more equal income distribution causes stricter regulations as the median voter’s de-
mand for environmental quality increases (Lieb, 2003). Kempf and Rossignol (2007)
build up a simple growth model in which public expenditures enhance either growth
or abatement activities. Public expenditures are chosen by democratic elections ac-
cording to a simple majority rule. They demonstrate that the poorer the median voter
relatively to the average individual, the higher are the preferences for growth. Hence,
the larger the inequality in the distribution of income, the more the environment gets
harmed. However, the empirical evidence is rather weak. Although the Gini coeffi-
cient as an indicator for the income distribution has frequently the presumed sign, it
is often not significant (e.g. Scruggs, 1998; Torras and Boyce, 1998; Borghesi, 2000;
Magnani, 2000; Gangadharan and Valenzuela, 2001). Of course, this might be due
to the poor data quality on the Gini coefficient in many countries (Torras and Boyce,
1998).
3.3 Technological and Organisational Changes
The next section is about the impact of technological progress on the pollution path.
Within the theoretical EKC literature there are two main emphases. The first focuses
on models explaining the EKC through shifts in the use of different pollutive pro-
duction technologies, whereas the second deals with the attributes of the abatement
technology.
Smulders et al. (2011) analyse the EKC resulting from endogenous innovations policy
induced technology shifts and intrasectoral changes. In their model, environmental
degradation arises from new production technology, which is superior due to higher
labour efficiency, but is at the same time more polluting. The larger pollution causes
public concern such that an emission tax is introduced. This public policy causes
first an immediate drop of pollution and following a constant pollution level as firms
reduce their production, before at some point a clean technology is invented. The
new technology reduces pollution and degradation approaches zero as more and more
firms adopt it. There are two critical conditions of the model. On the one hand, the
clean technology must be invented. On the other hand, the implemented tax must
be high enough to pay back the adoption of the new technology.
Stokey (1998) investigates how different production technologies affect the environ-
mental quality. In her model, at low income level clean technology is not affordable
such that only the dirtiest technology is used and pollution increases linearly with
economic growth. At the turning point, cleaner production technology is affordable
and it is used in order to decrease the level of pollution. Applying an AK endogenous
growth frame with decreasing returns to abatement6, Stokey shows that sustainable
6Stokey (1998) claims to use constant returns to scale in abatement, however, Brock and Taylor
(2005) demonstrate that Stokey’s setting actually implies decreasing returns to scale.
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growth is possible but not optimal. Rather, the growth of pollution chokes off eco-
nomic growth. However, this conclusion is not surprising since Stokey combines an
AK aggregate production function with strictly neoclassical attributes of abatement
(Brock and Taylor, 2005).
In contrast hereto, Hartman and Kwon (2005) find a possibility of sustained growth.
They build a two sector endogenous growth model with human and physical capital
as inputs, where physical capital causes pollution during the production and human
capital does not. In their model, the EKC arises from the marginal costs and benefits
of pollution. The rising branch of the EKC is when the marginal costs of pollution
exceed the marginal benefits and pollution is emitted unregulated. When this relation
turns around, pollution control starts and degradation is reduced. In their model, the
EKC is possible if the initial values are not too large such that the economy starts
in the unregulated case. However, if the initial values make the economy controlling
pollution from the very beginning, degradation simply falls over time.
The other group of models analyses the effects of abatement technology on pollution.
In one of the earlier studies among those, Selden and Song (1995) describe the EKC
as a result of a zero-abatement phase and a subsequently following phase with active
abatement. In the first period, the marginal utility of consumption is larger than the
marginal utility of a clean environment, such that abatement is not appreciated. In
the following period the sign changes and the economy reduces pollution.
Dinda (2005) elaborates a one-sector model where capital is allocated in production
and abatement. In his model, shifts from insufficient to sufficient abatement expen-
ditures give the EKC, but this does not occur in the steady state: Dinda argues that
the economy must be on a suboptimal growth path in order to experience the EKC.
Other studies focus on the effects of research and development (R&D) on technolog-
ical progress in abatement (e.g. Rubio et al., 2008, 2010). In both papers, the EKC
occurs from research driven technological change in abatement. First, the shadow
price of clean technology exceeds the costs of developing it, hence no new abatement
technology evolves. However, once the relationship turns around, firms do research
on superior abatement technology. The optimal investment patterns in capital and
R&D in these models support the EKC.
One point of critique should not be ignored. There is still the possibility that tech-
nological progress may cause the EKC for a single pollutant by substituting it by
a different one. This happens in the development of end-of-pipe and abatement
technologies as well as through insufficient environmental policy.
The consequences are overlapping EKCs (Smulders et al., 2011), a sequence of differ-
ent pollutants illustrated in Figure 2, or rising levels of other environmental hazards
despite the reduction of single pollutants (Dasgupta et al., 2002; Lieb, 2004).7
7Dasgupta et al. (2002) entitled this phenomenon as the "new toxics scenario".
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Figure 2: Pollution cycles according to Smulders et al. (2011), source: Lieb (2003)
End-of-pipe technologies for example are supposed to be the most important deter-
minant in causing the downturn of the EKC for SO2 (de Bruyn, 1997; Ekins, 1997).
However, these technologies require energy to be produced and to be kept running.
Since energy is mainly gained from fossil fuels, higher demand for energy causes higher
CO2 emissions (Faber et al., 1996). Therefore, end-of-pipe technologies actually sub-
stitute SO2 into CO2. This finds evidence in Stern (1998), where the author notes a
shift in emissions from SO2 and NOX towards CO2.
Another example is the substitution of fossil fuels by nuclear energy. Several studies
found that the increasing use of energy from nuclear power plants helped to lower the
emissions of SO2, SPM and NOX (Scruggs, 1998; Selden et al., 1999; Viguier, 1999).
Iwata et al. (2011) find evidence that nuclear energy also reduces CO2 emissions.
Since nuclear power does not cause environmental pollution directly but carries along
high risks for damaging the environment, the costs of environmental damages are
shifted to future generations. The dimensions of such risks emerged again after
the reactor accident in Japanese Fukushima Daiichi in 2011. The total scale of the
degradation is not completely assessable, however, first results are discussed e.g. in
Garnier-Laplace et al. (2011) showing higher radioactive contamination than what is
considered as a safe level for terrestrial ecosystems.
The substitution of pollutants may also occur in the abating process. While reduc-
ing certain kinds of pollution, abatement technologies may cause different polluting
substances themselves (Huesemann, 2001). Catalytic converters in cars for example
filter CO, NOX or hydrocarbons from the emissions. However, all these substances are
mainly transformed into CO2. Moreover, the converter increases the fuel use of the
engine, which includes higher CO2 emissions. Finally, it consists partly of platinum -
a metal that accumulates in the soil (Holzbaur et al., 1996).
Finally, policy-induced technological progress might also support pollutant substitu-
tion. If public regulation concentrates on the reduction of certain pollutants, firms will
substitute them in the production process by other, unregulated pollutants (Devlin
and Grafton, 1994; Smulders et al., 2011). In the study of Lieb (2004) it is assumed
that solely the impact of flow pollutants is immediate, while the one of stock pollu-
tants is perceivable only in the future. The substitution of pollutants is caused by
environmental policies: Myopic governments internalise only the external effects of
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the flow pollutants but do not regulate stock pollutants, since myopic governments
ignore future damages. The study demonstrates how an EKC for flow pollutants may
arise while the PIR for stock pollutants remains monotonically rising.
3.4 Structural Change
The next attempt to explain the EKC aims at changes in the structural composition
of countries. Changes in the composition may arise from variations in consumer be-
haviour, political institutions or international competitiveness (de Bruyn and Heintz,
1999). The idea expects countries to pass through several stages of development.
First, on subsistence level people do not produce any pollution. When becoming
richer, the countries face first intensified agriculture and light industry, later a de-
veloping industrialisation. The pollution level increases with production. Growing
further, the economy experiences a change away from industry towards the envi-
ronmental benign service sector; the environmental pressure decreases again (Arrow
et al., 1995; Baldwin, 1995; Lieb, 2003).
Moreover, the structure of the industry sector itself may change similarly. Syrquin
(1988) states that, first, with rising income, composition of the industrial sector shifts
from relative nonpolluting light manufacturing such as food production or textiles to
heavy, polluting industry such as chemicals, minerals and metals or machinery. Later,
at higher income levels, environmental friendly research activities and less polluting
high-tech industry become the main activity of the economy (Dinda et al., 2000) .
If the EKC is derived from structural change, it is not induced by environmental
policies. Instead, it would appear automatically (Gangadharan and Valenzuela, 2001).
Moreover, the intuition behind the transition from an agrarian economy to a developed
service economy is very clear. However, this claim does not stand without critique.
De Groot (1999) challenges the automatism. He concludes that structural change
may help to reduce pollution, however, it is not sufficient to cause the downturn
of the EKC. In contrast, technological progress is crucial for the emerging of the
EKC. The results of Cassou and Hamilton (2004) are akin. In their model, the EKC
follows structural change, whereat the structural change is caused by rising taxes on
pollution, i.e. it is policy-induced.
Furthermore, empirical evidence is ambiguous. Several studies include an additional
regressor on the manufacturing share in GDP (Lieb, 2003). Some conclude that
pollution moves along the structural change (Rock, 1996; Panayotou, 1997; Borghesi,
2000; Cole, 2000), others state that the effect of structural change is only small if
not insignificant (Grossman et al., 1994; Grossman, 1995; Suri and Chapman, 1998).
Hence, transition effects can verify at most a small part of the EKC. Moreover,
according to Cole (2000) and Millimet (2001) structural change alone cannot explain
the EKC. This supports the statement of de Groot (1999) claiming that policy and
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technological progress are crucial for the shape of the EKC.
In order to examine the impact of structural change on environmental quality more
precisely, some empirical studies make use of decomposition analyses. For such anal-
ysis, the amount of emissions are split into the single components discussed in chap-
ter 2.3, the scale effect, the composition effect and the technique effect. The scale
effect – represented by GDP – describes, how income growth affects emissions. The
composition effect – delineate by the output share of one sector in total output –
demonstrates the impact of structural changes on environmental degradation. The
technique effect finally – i.e. the emission intensity of one sector – analyses, in which
way technological progress causes lower emissions.
Many surveys apply decomposition analyses to emissions of SO2, CO, CO2, SPM,
NOX, VOC and heavy metals (see e.g. Torvanger, 1991; de Bruyn, 1997; Selden
et al., 1999; Viguier, 1999). Selden and Song (1994) and Grossman and Krueger
(1995) for example argue that the EKC may indeed arise from an interaction of
scale, composition and technology effects. However, most of the studies find that the
composition effect is small, whereas the technique effect has always a large impact.
Furthermore, while the technique effect always decreases emission, in some studies
the composition effect even causes pollution.8 Hence, decomposition analyses also
demonstrate that the composition effect is not elementary for the downturn of the
EKC, but the technique effect is.
Additionally, there is another often neglected point of critique about the composition
effect as reason for the EKC. Even though changes in the industry-structure may
lower the marginal pollution intensity of output, they cannot erase the scale effect
completely, unless the polluting sector shrinks in absolute matters. Yet, this is possible
only if the pollution-intensive industry produces inferior goods – a rather improbable
assumption – or if this sector’s products are no longer manufactured domestically but
abroad and imported (Torras and Boyce, 1998). This case will be discussed in the
following section.
3.5 International Reallocation
As stated above, to be able to explain the EKC with structural change it is neces-
sary that the production of pollution-intensive goods is moved abroad and the dirty
commodities become import goods. Many scholars (e.g. Arrow et al., 1995; Stern
et al., 1996; Ekins, 1997; Rothman, 1998) point out that changes in the composition
of production are linked to both consumption and trade. If consumption does not
change similarly as the industrial structure does, then the appearing differences in
8The only exception for a clear finding of the composition effect are Ederington et al. (2004).
In their study on the US economy they found that at the end of the 20th century dramatic shifts
towards cleaner industries have been observed.
3 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 20
local production and consumption need to be compensated by imports. Hence, in
developed countries the polluting commodities will be imported from the developing
world, which may explain the environmental improvements in the rich countries and
the degradation in the poor countries in recent years (Cole and Neumayer, 2005).
Saint-Paul (1995) extends this allegation in saying that dirty industry first migrates
from rich countries to middle-income countries due to their developed infrastructure
in comparison to poor countries. His model leads to low pollution in high-income
countries, and to high pollution in middle-income countries. This scenario would be
alarming for the least developed countries, since once they are more developed, they
would not have any place where to relocate their polluting industry to. Thus, these
countries will need to abate emissions instead of moving it to other countries, which
will be much more difficult (Lieb, 2003).
Displacement may take two forms. On the one hand, firms may actually replace their
production site in developed countries with similar sites in developing countries. This
happened for instance in industries with high toxic intensities (Birdsall and Wheeler,
1992) or in the leather tanning industry (Ayres, 1997). On the other hand, polluting
industries may grow faster in the developing world than in developed countries (Low,
1992; Perrings and Ansuageti, 2000). Moreover, Stern (1998) finds even on the
domestic level of the USA that the poorest U.S. states host relatively more polluting
industry than the richest, which account for a large service sector. Hence, migration
of dirty industry could explain the results of Carson et al. (1997), who observe an EKC
for several pollutants across different states in the USA. However, the reallocation
as explanation for the EKC is questionable. As mentioned above, the results for
structural change imply that the removal of dirty industries is too slow to explain the
decline of the absolute production level of these industries in developed countries. So
only the fast growth of dirty production in developing countries remains as a reason.
But this can solely explain a cross country EKC, not the EKC for a single growing
developed country over time (Lieb, 2003).
According to the standard trade theory, countries export if they have a comparative
advantage in producing one good.9 From comparative advantages results the Pollu-
tion Haven Hypothesis. Usually, pollution-intensive goods are capital-intensive. Thus,
with uniform environmental regulations, developed countries would have a compara-
tive advantage to produce them (Cole and Elliott, 2003; Copeland and Taylor, 2004;
Cole and Elliott, 2005). However, by implementing looser environmental policies,
poor countries take over this advantage (Antweiler et al., 2001; Copeland and Taylor,
2004) and specialise in dirty production (Suri and Chapman, 1998; Stern, 1998; Cole
and Elliott, 2003; Mani and Iha, 2006). Therefore, developed countries will have a
more stringent environmental policy and ergo a comparative advantage in produc-
ing clean goods, whereas developing countries will have a comparative advantage in
9The idea of comparative advantage is discussed in the standard literature regarding international
trade, (e.g. Feenstra, 2004)
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dirty commodities. These countries with high concentrations of pollution are called
pollution havens.10
Another consequence of reallocating polluting industries might be a "race to the bot-
tom". In this scenario, dirty industries first migrate to countries with weak environ-
mental regulations as in the Pollution Havens Hypothesis. Simultaneously, more and
more capital flows out from the developed countries towards the developing countries,
because the capital-intensive industries – now, due to the comparative advantage in
the developing countries – attract investments. This financial pressure forces govern-
ments in the rich countries to relax their environmental standards. When relaxation
happens more frequently in more and more developed countries, the EKC flattens and
rises towards the highest existing level of pollution (Dasgupta et al., 2002).
Empirical evidence for the "race to the bottom" is not conclusive. As a matter of
fact, the costs of regulation for polluting activities are in rich countries higher than in
developing countries (Jaffe et al., 1995; Mani and Wheeler, 1998). Hence, there is an
incentive for companies to relocate their dirty production sites. However, it seems that
pollution-control costs are in comparison to other factors not a major determinant for
moving (e.g. Levinson, 1997; Jänicke et al., 1997; Albrecht, 1998). Mody and Wheeler
(1992) define as more important factors the distance to the market and the quality and
costs of infrastructure, as suggested by Saint-Paul (1995). Furthermore, trade from
high-income economies to developing countries tend to be more pollution-intensive
than trade in the other direction (Mani and Wheeler, 1998; Albrecht, 1998). This
suggests that the scenario of dirty industries first relocating to low-income countries
and then exporting their goods back to developed countries does not hold.
According to the idea of "the race to the bottom", pollution in developing countries
should increase since they are pollution havens, and pollution should increase in high-
income economies because they have to relax their environmental standards in order
to remain cost-competitive. Testing these prepositions for air pollution, Wheeler
(2001) finds for Brazil, China and Mexico contrasting results. As foreign direct
investment (FDI) into these countries increase, they should face increasing pollution,
too. Moreover, air pollution in U.S. cities should worsen, since at the same time
expanding industrial imports from all three countries should force the US government
to slacken environmental policies. However, the opposite holds. While FDI increase,
pollution in the emerging countries decline. Similarly, pollution in US cities diminish,
too. Hence, the race to the bottom does not gain evidence from empirical findings.
10This idea gains support from the fact that environmental quality tends to be a normal good.
As income increases, demand for environmental quality increases, too. Thus, environmental policy
tends to be more stringent in rich countries than in poor states, which includes that rich countries
have a comparative advantage in developing clean goods (Cole, 2004).
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4 Learning by Doing and Induced Innovation in Abate-
ment
As it was shown in the previous chapter, technological progress remained as the only
reasonable explanation for the existence of the EKC. Behavioural change and institu-
tional change both rely on technological progress to impose the wish for less pollution.
Empirical evidence speaks against structural change and international reallocation can
only explain the cross country EKC, not the EKC of a single growing country. In the
following chapters, I will discuss the effects of technological progress in abatement
on the EKC more closely. I assume that technological change results from learning
by doing. The idea of learning by doing was primarily discussed by Arrow (1962). In
his contribution, firms experience an increase in productivity through learning effects.
In other words, learning by doing causes positive externalities – in the case of Arrow
higher productivity per worker – that enhance output.
The basic idea of learning by doing is prominent in both growth theory and envi-
ronmental economics. The output enhancing externality may come from knowledge
spillover effects in aggregate R&D (Romer, 1986) or from accumulating human cap-
ital (Lucas, 1988).Thus, in endogenous growth models learning by doing is often
detectable. In the simplest specification – the AK model firstly introduced by Rebelo
(1991) to which I refer throughout in my text – learning by doing generates constant
returns in capital accumulation on nationwide economy.
The concept of learning by doing is also important in environmental economics. Sev-
eral studies point out the importance of induced innovation in solving problems con-
cerned with pollution (e.g. Jaffe et al., 1995; Bramoullé and Olson, 2005). As argued
in Chapter 3.3, technological progress in abatement reduces pollution output. From
decomposition analyses we know that the main drive behind the EKC is technological
change. Although the source of the progress is not identified, there is support that
it is caused by learning by doing. Analysing the technological progress of flue gas
desulphurisation11, Bellas (1998) finds evidence that the improvements come rather
from learning by doing than from efforts in R&D.
The presence of learning by doing in abatement or "learning by abating" (Bretschger
and Smulders, 2007) augments the relationship between growth and environment with
several new features. For instance, the costs of pollution control vary through learning
by doing in abatement (Brock and Taylor, 2005). As in the model of Arrow (1962),
where learning effects reduce the production costs, externalities in the abatement
process can reduce the costs of abatement. If the learning effects are unbounded,
then spillover effects may allow for positive growth and falling pollution levels while the
abatement costs for society are decreasing. Hence, sustainable growth could dispense
11Flue gas desulphurisation is a technique that helps to reduce the emission of SO2 during the
combustion of coal.
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with public policy as the spillover effects can solve the environmental problems by
itself. If the learning effects are bounded, then the consequences of learning by abating
for environmental policy are less clear. Nevertheless, Brock and Taylor argue that
environmental policies are less effective because technological progress implements
higher abatement regardless of the presence of public policy.
Another implication of learning by abating results in the linkage of the sectors subject
to innovations. If the general knowledge stock grows and spillovers are included, then
learning by doing is one option to connect innovations in abatement with technological
change in production. It enables us to make the assumptions about spillover effects
and technological change consistent across sectors. This is important since it is the
relative rates in technological progress between output and abatement that determine
the sustainability of the balanced growth path (Brock and Taylor, 2005).12
A final feature of learning by abating can be one form of induced innovation, although
it is often modelled as a passive process implying that investments are not target-
oriented. If so, it is not clear where technological progress comes from, but it is
important to identify the driving factors behind innovations in abatement (Popp,
2002). These driving factors could actually be the effects of the price of pollution. If
the deterioration of the environment calls for the implementation of abatement and
abatement is subject to knowledge spillovers, then the technological progress arises
from the higher costs of pollution, which is a clear characteristic of induced innovation
(Brock and Taylor, 2005).
In the following, I will discuss the effects of learning by abating on the EKC. First, I will
discuss the case when spillover effects result in constant returns to abatement such
that the abatement costs for society become constant. Later in Chapter 5, I discuss
the case when learning by doing leads to increasing returns to scale in abatement
implying that abatement costs are diminishing on societal level. In the end I will
compare the two approaches. Furthermore, spillover effects question the efficiency of
environmental policy. I will discuss the need for regulations in the applied models,
showing that drawing this conclusion against regulation is too simple. Instead, it
will be obvious that public policy still is an important factor of the EKC hypothesis
despite the existence of learning effects.
In this chapter I focus on how learning by doing in abatement leads to constant returns
to abatement and the corresponding effects on the PIR. I follow the arguments of
Brock and Taylor (2003) that abatement activity depends on the relative marginal
price of abatement in comparison with consumption. First, I sketch the frame of the
model. I demonstrate how spillover effects cause constant returns to abatement on
12This is easy to see when comparing e.g. the articles of Brock and Taylor (2010) and Stokey
(1998): While Brock and Taylor (2010) allows for both technological progress in production and
abatement, in Stokey (1998) technological progress is only possible in production, not in abatement.
The result is that sustainable growth in Brock and Taylor (2010) is possible, whereas it is not in
Stokey (1998).
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a nationwide level. After that I discuss in what way this model is consistent with the
EKC and sustainable growth, followed by the analysis of the turning point and its
determinants.
4.1 The EKC and Constant Returns to Abatement
To discuss the effects of learning by abating on the EKC, I introduce the Kindergarten
Rule model of Brock and Taylor (2003). The model is based on the assumption
of knowledge spillovers in the abatement technology, which keeps pollution under
control. I assume that learning by doing eliminates diminishing returns to both capital
and abatement on firm level causing constant returns to capital and to abatement on
aggregate level. The result is a model in which learning by abating reduces the costs
of abatement but does not eliminate the drag of environmental policy completely.
Since I am interested in the consequences of technological progress on the environ-
ment and on economic growth, I use the idea of linking factor accumulation and
technological progress as in Romer (1986) or Lucas (1988). For this I generate a
simple one-sector model of endogenous growth and environmental degradation.
I apply a model with an infinitely living representative agent. There is one single
aggregated output good Y . The two factors of production are labour L and capital
K. Since this is a one-sector model, capital is meant in very broad terms including
both physical and human capital. I expect the capital stock to grow with investments
and decreases via a constant depreciation δ, whereas population is assumed to be
constant over time. Pollution P results entirely from flow pollutants and has only
local impacts. Capital Kt, consumption Ct, output Yt, and pollution Pt vary across
time, indicated by subscript t. However, I will suppress the time index if it is not
needed.
Preferences
The utility of a representative agent depends on two variables, consumption C and
pollution P . The utility function is
U = U(C,P ), (2)
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U(C,P )e−ρt dt, (5)
where the above mentioned attributes hold. The time preference is denoted as ρ. For
analyses it is useful to specify the utility function as a function of constant elasticity
of substitution:
U(C,P ) = C1−ε1−ε − zP
γ
γ
for ε 6= 1 (6)
U(C,P ) = lnC − zP γ
γ
for ε = 1 (7)
with ε > 0 and γ ≥ 1. The impact of pollution on the individual household is
measured by z.
Production
Production follows standard assumptions. Each firm produces i final output good
Y with the input factors labour L and capital K. The firm’s production function is
assumed to be strictly concave with constant returns to scale (CRS). The technology
level T describes the productivity of labour and is given for every individual. Similar
to Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), I propose that the level of technology is commen-
surate to an economy wide measure of activity, similar to aggregate R&D in the case
of Romer and to average human capital in the case of Lucas. In the specification of
an AK model, the stage of technology is connected either to the aggregate capital




Next, I want to demonstrate the role of knowledge spillovers in the aggregated econ-
omy level. To do so, I aggregate production across firms in order to obtain an AK
aggregate production function due to comprehensibility. First consider production of
one single firm i where the input factor labour is affected by the general technology
level T such that
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Yi = F i (Ki, TLi) . (9)
The input factors are capitalKi and labour Li, i denotes the ith firm. The production
function is assumed to be strictly concave in Ki and Li such that
∂F i
∂Li










Furthermore, it has constant returns to scale (CRS). However, labour is affected by
knowledge spillovers from the general technology level T . Total production is the







F i (Ki, TLi) . (10)
Next, let us assume that relative prices for labour and capital are more or less equal
across firms. This homogeneity implies that all firms use the same amount of capital
and labour for their production, i.e. Ki = K and Li = L for all i. If the input factors
are identical for all firms, then we can write the sum of all production function as one
production function for the whole economy as ∑i F i(K,TL) = F (K,TL). Hence,
we can rewrite aggregate production as
Y = F (K,TL) . (11)
Since all firms are identical, efficiency requires that all firms apply the same capital
intensity K
TL








Finally, we can exploit the definition of T = K
L
such that also capital vanishes from
the set of production. Now, the production technology does not depend anymore
on K nor TL as F (1, 1) = constant. Thus, we can rewrite aggregate production
only depending on capital and the constant production technology which I define as
F (1, 1) ≡ A:
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Y = KF (1, 1) = AK where F (1, 1) ≡ A. (13)
Here we find that the production function solves in a linear function of K. I define
the constant term in the last line as F (1, 1) ≡ A, where A represents the marginal
product of capital and the general level of technology likewise. As shown above,
technological progress converts diminishing returns to capital at the firm level into
constant returns on the aggregate economy level. Thus, the production function is a
simple AK model:
Y = AK. (14)
Pollution







where X represents gross pollution and B(X,Φ) abated pollution. I assume that
gross pollution is a by-product of economic activity, which is a standard assump-
tion (Xepapadeas, 2005). It can arise either from production or from consumption.
Likewise, abatement depends correspondingly on the creation of pollution X and on
the type of abatement Φ, where Φ can be the share of total production dedicated
to abatement or the environmental effort of market participants. Unless an open
economy setting is assumed, both approaches lead to the same results.
Net pollution increases with gross pollution such that PX > 0 and decreases with
abatement PB < 0. For simplicity, I assume that emitted pollution is the difference
between gross pollution and abated pollution, thus:
P = X −B(X,Φ). (16)
At that point, let us think of gross pollution as a by-product of a company’s gross
production Y Gi . The input factors of the abatement function are Y Gi representing
X and and expenditures for abatement Y Ai replacing Φ such that abatement in (16)
turns into B(Y Gi , Y Ai ). The abatement production function is strictly concave and
has CRS such that
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∂B
∂Y Gi










Hence, returns to abatement are diminishing for each firm. Pollution emitted by a
single firm is
Pi = Y Gi −B(Y Gi , Y Ai ). (17)
Now, consider that – analogously to aggregate production – there is on aggregate
level an abatement technology parameter Γ , which increases the marginal product






The technology level affects the efficiency of abatement due to learning by doing. To
see this, let us assume that Γ influences the capacity of cleaning Y Gi in the abatement
function of (17) such that
Pi = Y Gi −B(Y Gi Γ, Y Ai ). (19)
Again, let us assume that abatement is homogenous for each firm. Then, all firms
produce the same amount Y Gi and use the same share of GDP for abatement Y Ai .
Moreover, abatement is identical for all firms due to the homogeneity. Due to that,
we can factor out Y Gi and Γ from the abatement function and rewrite the pollution
function for each firm as










Here we can see that through the elimination of (Y Gi Γ ) from the abatement function
we discover that one input factor of abatement becomes equal to one and thus




, which actually is the abatement
intensity of firm i under consideration of the spillover effects through Γ . Next, we
can derive aggregate pollution which is the sum of each firm’s net emission:

















Since all firms are homogeneous, we can treat the whole economy as one agent.
Hence, we can say that ∑i Y Gi = Y G and ∑i Y Gi = AA which allows us to rewrite
the aggregated pollution function as
P = Y G
1− ΓB




where the second input factor of abatement becomes constant because of the defini-
tion of Γ = Y A
Y G
. Thus, abatement is not anymore a function but a constant which we
can define as B(1, 1) ≡ a. Since the productivity of abatement must be larger than
one as abatement must be able to clean more than just its own negative effects, it
is clear that a > 1. Additionally, let us define the aggregated intensity of abatement
as θ ≡ Y A
Y G
, which is equal to Γ . Therefore, we the aggregate pollution function is
P = Y G [1− θa] . (23)




must hold, because abatement can maximally reduce the flow of pollution. Otherwise
pollution might be negative, which is not plausible in reality. Gross output includes
all produced goods and with respect to (14) it is Y G ≡ Y = AK. Therefore, we can
rewrite the pollution function as
P = AK (1− θa) . (25)
It should be pointed out that the aggregate relationship between pollution and abate-
ment in (25) is consistent with empirical estimates which find rising marginal abate-
ment costs at the firm level (for sulphur e.g. Cofala and Syri, 1998). To see this,
consider again equation (17), which describes the pollution function for each individ-
ual firm depending on its output and abatement:
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Pi = Y Gi −B(Y Gi Γ, Y Ai ).
Taking the first and the second partial derivative and rearranging them to get the









This demonstrates that the marginal abatement costs are increasing for each individual
firm. Or in other words, each firm faces diminishing returns to abatement.
Next, I want to show that unlike the firm level, at the society level the marginal
costs of abatement are constant. For this, consider again (17). As only Γ and Y Ai































Y Ai + ∂B∂Γ Γ
, (30)
where we also exploit the fact that firms are identical and hence Y Gi = Y G = ΓY A
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and see that the total differential is constant as 1
a
is constant. This result is the same
as differentiating the aggregate relationship between pollution and abatement in (23).
Hence, I can summarise that technological progress linked to aggregate abatement
intensity eliminates decreasing returns to abatement – and thus rising marginal costs
for abatement – on the firm level such that the marginal costs of abatement for the
whole society are constant.
The planner’s problem is now the aggregate production function (14), the aggre-
gate pollution function (23) and the atemporal resource constraint connecting gross
production Y G, net output Y N and abatement Y A:
Y N = Y G − Y A. (32)
4.2 The Kindergarten Rule
Next, I concentrate on the question if and how balanced growth is feasible. For this,
consider the representative agent problem (5) and apply there the utility function of













K˙ = AK(1− θ)− δK − C (34)
P = AK(1− θa) (35)
K(0) = K0, (36)
where K˙ shows the evolution of the capital stock increasing with net production
and decreasing with depreciation δ and consumption C. P represents the pollution
function for flow pollutants. I assume that there is no pollution stock since empirical
evidence supports only the EKC for flow pollutants, not for stock pollutants. Finally,
I assume that the initial value of the capital stock at time t = 0 is K0.
Remember from equation (24) that abatement cannot eliminate more pollution than
produced and hence θ ≤ 1
a




z [AK (1− θa)]γ
γ
+ λ [AK (1− θ)− δK − C] . (37)
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As corresponding first order condition (FOC) for consumption C we obtain
∂H
∂C
= C−ε − λ = 0, (38)











]γ−1 − λ = 0. (40)
The co-state equation for the shadow price λ is











and the transversality condition (TVC)
lim
t→∞λtKte
−ρt = 0 (42)
must hold. Next, I want to discuss the question of when the representative agent
will abate. For this, let us define that the derivative of H with respect to θ is the
function G(θ, λ), such that
∂H
∂θ
≡ G(θ, λ) = az [AK (1− θa)]γ−1 − λ. (43)
This describes the marginal utility of abatement. The first term of the equation
indicates the marginal damage of pollution; λ is the shadow price of capital, so the
marginal utility of capital. Furthermore, let us consider as a starting point the case
without any abatement in order to analyse which abatement behaviour is optimal for
the agent. G(θ, λ) is then
G(θ, λ)|θ=0 = az (AK)γ−1 − λ. (44)
Three different cases may occur: G(θ, λ) can be negative, positive or zero. If
G(θ, λ) < 0, then the marginal utility of capital exceeds the marginal damage of
pollution. Therefore, the agent prefers to accumulate capital and does not care about
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the environment and abatement equals zero, because abating worsens the household’s
utility. This case I call S−. In the opposite case S+, the marginal damage outnumbers
the shadow price of capital such that G(θ, λ) > 0. Ergo, the household tries to abate
as much as possible since pollution causes a larger utility loss than capital is able
to generate. Ergo, the household chooses θ = 1
a
≡ θK . Finally, in S0 the marginal
damage equals the shadow price and G(θ, λ) = 0. This case is already optimal as the
first derivation is zero. The agent is indifferent between abating and accumulating
capital. Hence, abatement is set such that θ ∈ [0; θK ]. The following equations
define the three cases S−, S0 and S+ formally for any combination of {K,λ}:
S− =
{








{K,λ} |G(θ, λ)|θ=0 = az (AK)γ−1 − λ > 0
}
Brock and Taylor (2003) entitle the maximal abatement intensity θ = θK as "the
Kindergarten Rule", because economies adopting the Kindergarten Rule clean up
straight after creating pollution.13 The following steps analyse the motion of the
system in all three sections when γ = 1 and when γ > 1.
The Dynamics for γ = 1
First, consider the case that γ = 1, where G(θ, λ) is then
G(θ, λ)|γ=1 = az − λ. (45)
As the marginal damage from pollution az is constant, (45) depends only on λ, but
not on θ. This means that the representative agent cannot influence the switching
moment through abatement activity.
Now let us distinguish the motion of the system in all sections, starting with S0.
It is obvious that (45) cannot remain equal to zero, because of the motion of the
shadow price given in (41). As λ is changing all the time, S0 is unstable and switches
immediately either to S+ or to S−, depending if λ becomes larger or smaller. Hence,
we know that in the case of γ = 1 abatement is either zero or it is set to the largest
possible value θK .
13Brock and Taylor refer to the book All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten:
Uncommon Thoughts on Common Things by Robert Fulghum, which provides a list of common
kindergarten rules. Among others, "clean up your own mess" – the Kindergarten Rule – is according
to Fulghum one of the basic values we are taught at young age that "are the bedrock of a meaningful
life" (Brock and Taylor, 2003).
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Next, consider a set of {K,λ} that puts us in S+ and abatement appears at its














where g ≡ A(1 − θK) − δ − ρ. As long as A(1 − θK) > δ + ρ, the shadow price
becomes constantly smaller over time. This is a standard assumption in growth theory
which I simply assume to hold at that point, leaving the discussion to the end of the
subchapter. If g > 0 holds, then the growth rate of λ is negative, the shadow price
for capital falls. This is plausible as the shadow price represents also the marginal
utility of capital and with a growing capital stock the marginal utility decreases. We
can rewrite (46) such that it gives the value λ at any period t we get:14
λt = λ0e−gt. (47)
It is obvious that the shadow price for capital decreases all the time in S+ as g is
by definition positive. Furthermore, we can take advantage of λt when solving the














We can see that Kt grows over time, because the exponent outside the brackets is
positive and the exponent inside is negative. Hence, for large t the integral approaches
zero and the negative term vanishes. Therefore, depending on the initial parameter
values, Kt may first fall and later rise again or grow permanently.
Yet, we do not know what happens if t approaches infinity. In order to see this, I plug
(47) and (48) into the TVC and find
λ0 = [hK0]−ε , (49)





+ ρ.16 As standard sufficient condition for the TVC it is
satisfactory that h > 0 must hold. This means that in case ε < 1, the time preference
of the agent needs to be large enough to offset the negativity of the first term of h.
14The procedure is derived in detail in Appendix A.2.1.
15The derivation is illustrated in Appendix A.2.3.2.
16The derivation of (49) is given in Appendix A.3.
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Using this in (47), it is obvious that, as long as g is positive, λt is a strictly monotonic
decreasing function of K0 and hence sustainable growth is possible. Furthermore, the
dynamics of λt imply that the system remains in S+ until infinity.
Finally, I want to know if there exists a balanced growth path. For this, let us start
with the growth rate of consumption. From (38) we know, that
C = λ− 1ε . (50)






From here, it is easy to derive the steady state. In the steady state all relevant




= [A(1− θ)− δ]− C
K
, (52)
we can see that on the balanced growth path capital must grow with the same rate
as consumption to keep the growth rate of capital constant. Furthermore, due to the
linear production technology, it is obvious, that the growth rate of production must
equal them, too. Therefore, we can conclude that the balanced growth path is the
trajectory that satisfies




Next, suppose that the initial value for capital K0 let us start in S−. Then abatement
equals zero and θ = 0. Replacing this in (41) and (34), we can solve the differential
equation for λt as17
λt = λ0e−(A−δ−ρ)t +
Az
A− δ − ρ (54)
17The derivation is provided in detail in Appendix A.2.2.
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and for Kt as18
Kt = e(A−δ)t













As in case S+, λt falls exponentially over time approaching zero as long as g > 0 holds.
This attribute of λt is regardless its constant term. Capital increases over time as
the exponents of the second and third term in squared brackets are negative, whereas
the function outside the brackets has a positive power. Hence, with increasing t their
negative impact on Kt becomes smaller and smaller until it vanishes as for high values
of t the integrals approach zero. Then, only the positive terms are left such that Kt
increases constantly.
However, the system in S− is not stable. Since az – the border of the shadow price to
switch from S− to S+ – is a positive number and as λ approaches zero, there exists
a value for λ in finite time for which equation (43) becomes non-negative and shifts
the system into the above discussed case of S+. Therefore, S− is not sustainable and
always turns into the second stage, where abatement is active.
The Dynamics for γ > 1
Next, I discuss the more difficult case γ > 1. However, this does not change anything
in dynamics in S+ and S− from those in case of γ = 1. Solely S0 requires a closer
look. Since some abatement occurs in S0 such that θ > 0 and as S0 is defined such
that G(θ, λ) = 0, (43) reads as
G(θ, λ) = az [AK (1− θa)]γ−1 − λ = 0, (56)
where θ = θK is never optimal for any positive values of λ. Therefore, abatement











Plugging this result into (34) and (41) we obtain the state/co-state-equations:19
18Cf. Appendix A.2.3.3.
19In Appendix A.2.1 I show that λ˙ = −gλ is true.
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λ˙ = −gλ (58)
K˙ = (g + ρ)K +Dλ
1
γ−1 − C, (59)






γ−1 and recalling equation (38), C = λ− 1ε . As before, we can
solve the differential equation20 and rewrite the shadow price depending on t only
such that
λt = λ0e−gt. (60)
It is obvious that λt falls constantly over time. Similarly, we can solve the differential






















We can see that in the long run, Kt increases over time since the exponent outside
the squared brackets is positive but the integrals inside the brackets have a negative
exponent. Thus, for large t the integrals approach zero such that all negative terms
of Kt vanish.
Using the TVC yields a relationship between the initial capital stock K0 and the initial
























+ ρ. In order to distinguish the
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The total derivative indicates that λ0 is a decreasing function ofK0, hence, the higher
K0, the lower λ0. Thus, a large initial value of capital implies a low initial shadow
price such that for K0 we can expect to be in S+. As λt falls constantly over time it
is clear that the system remains in S+ once it enters.
From (60) and (61) we know that in S0 λt shrinks exponentially over time and Kt
increase in the long run. Using this information on (57), we see that θ must grow
steadily in the long run too, until the maximal value θK is reached. Then, however,
the system switches to S+ and it remains there as in the case shown above.
Finally, suppose the initial conditions put the system into S−. Since λt remains the
same as (54) in S− and falls steadily over time, the system is not sustainable in S−
because once λt falls below the level of the stage switch and S0 is entered.
Just as in the case of γ = 1, we know from (58) that the growth rate of consumption
is gC = gε > 0. As θ increases with ongoing time, the growth rates of capital
and output approximate those values of the case of γ = 1. Ergo, if we are in S0
and γ > 1 holds, then the intensity of abatement approaches the Kindergarten Rule
asymptotically.
The Assumption of g > 0
As mentioned above, one crucial assumption for sustainable growth is g ≡ A(1 −
θK)− δ − ρ > 0. This assumption however is quite similar to the assumption of the
standard AK model: usually, the marginal product of capital must offset depreciation
and impatience (e.g. Novales et al., 2010, p. 258). In this model, the marginal product
of capital adjusted for the abatement costs must be sufficiently high. Furthermore,
it must be ensured that A(1− θK) is positive. Yet, this is given since abatement per
definitionem is a productive activity. This is obvious from θK ≡ 1
a
: As mentioned
above, a > 1 is true because abatement must be able to clean the pollution caused
by itself plus the dirt it is supposed to lower, otherwise it is not abatement. To put
it differently, if abatement produces one unit of pollution, it must reduce a > 1 units
of pollution to be effective. Therefore, the required condition, that A(1 − θK) is
positive, holds.
Nevertheless, it is still necessary that the adjusted marginal product of capital exceeds
the depreciation δ and the time preference ρ. If the reduction of pollution is not very
effective, a will be close to unity and so will θK . This in turn means that growth will
not happen. Additionally, if capital is not very productive or if the level of depreciation
and/or impatience is high enough to satisfy A(1− θK) < δ + ρ, economic growth is
not possible. However, as said before, these are general requirements for any kind of
growth wherefore the assumption of g > 0 seems to be appropriate.
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4.3 The Turning Point
In the following section I want to discuss the turning point and the factors that
influence it. The turning point is the locus, in which abatement starts to be non-
zero. Hence, the turning point divides the model into two stage; in stage I, there is no
abatement, whereas in stage II society reduces the emitted pollution. In order to find
the turning point, let us think first about the case when γ = 1. Recall that abatement
occurs when (45) is non-negative and S+ starts.23 Therefore, for the turning point
we have λ∗ = az. Moreover, from (49) we know that the TVC of stage II requires
that
λ∗ = [hK∗]−ε . (65)



















and thus the turning point for γ = 1 is at












The graphical solution of the PIR for γ = 1 is provided in Figure 3. If the parameters
remain constant, we can see that the PIR rises with the same rate independent from
the initial capital stock. Moreover, for a certain set of parameters the turning point
is the same for any path. Hence, K0 only defines the starting point of the system
and thus the pollution level at the turning point: The smaller K0, the higher is the
pollution level at Y ∗. For small values of Y , pollution increases due to the fact that
abatement is zero. For Y > Y ∗, abatement is at its maximum. Since I consider
pollution as a flow variable, full reduction leads to a zero-pollution scenario. This
gives an EKC-shaped PIR, where the turning point covers the whole down turn of the
EKC. It should be mentioned that the initial values of an economy affects its pollution
path. The smaller the initial value of capital, the higher is the level of pollution in the
turning point. This occurs because a poor economy faces the turning point relatively
late in comparison to a rich country. Since capital grows longer without abatement
employed, pollution grows simultaneously to a higher peak. However, poor and rich
23Remember that in the case of γ = 1 S0 is not stable and shifts immediately forward into S+.




Figure 3: EKC and turning point for γ = 1
countries reduce pollution at the same level of Y , whereafter the economy experiences
zero pollution regardless its initial attributes.
For γ > 1, deriving the turning point is more complex. However, the approach is the
same. The change from a non-abating to an abating regime happens when
λ∗ = az (AK∗)γ−1 (68)




























Hence, the turning point is at





















Figure 4: EKC and turning point for γ > 1
Again, the turning point is a vertical line, meaning the initial conditions of a country
do not affect the application of abatement: it will always switch from stage I to state
II in Y ∗. However, the initial conditions do affect the amount of pollution the country
faces at the turning point. The smaller K0, the higher the peak level of P at the
turning point. As in the case of γ = 1, a poorer country needs relatively more time
to accumulate capital to reach the turning point. Meanwhile, pollution accrues such
that at the turning point an initially poor country has a larger burden of pollution
than a initially richer country. However, as t approaches infinity, the difference of
pollution level fades as gross pollution falls to zero and flow pollution implies that
there is no stock of pollution that needs to be reduced. The case of γ > 1 is pictured
in Figure 4.
It is important to analyse the determinants of the turning point. To do so, we are
interested in the comparative statics of the turning point and its determining factors,
that means in ∂Y ∗
∂x
for x ∈ {A, a, z, ρ, δ} for γ = 1 and γ > 1. The calculations of the
derivatives are provided in Appendix A.4. The results listed in Table 2 are however
partly ambiguous. Starting the discussion with γ = 1, we still need to differentiate
whether ε is larger, smaller or equal to unity.
For ε = 1, the results for all determinants can be derived. The derivative with respect
to A is larger than zero, hence an increase in A leads to a higher turning point. The
opposite holds for a, z and ρ: The larger they are, the lower the turning point. δ
does not affect the turning point at all, the derivative is zero. For ε > 1, for all
determinants but A the derivatives are clear. Any increase of a, z and ρ shifts the
turning point inwards and Y ∗ becomes smaller. An increase in δ works the opposite
direction such that Y ∗ shifts outwards. For A, the derivate depends on the values of
the parameters. For ε < 1, the results for a turn around: Now Y ∗ becomes larger as
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Table 2: Comparative static results for Y ∗
∂Y ∗
∂x
for x ∈ {A, a, z, ρ, δ}
γ = 1, γ = 1, γ = 1, γ > 1, γ > 1, γ > 1,
ε = 1 ε > 1 ε < 1 ε = 1 ε > 1 ε < 1
A > 0 ? ? ? ? ?
a < 0 < 0 > 0 ? ? ?
z < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
ρ < 0 < 0 < 0 ? ? ?
δ 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 ? ?
a rises, whereas it shrinks with z, ρ and δ. Again, for A the results are unclear since
they depend on the values of the parameters. Thus, a general statement for A is not
possible.
For γ > 1 it is significantly more difficult to provide any clear statements from
the comparative statics. Explicit results are possible only for a few variables: the
derivative with respect to z is positive for any ε, and the derivative with respect to δ
is positive for ε = 1. In all other cases, the turning point equation is too complex and
depends on the parameters’ values. Therefore, for γ > 1 the model must be solved
numerically to receive proper answers. This however would go beyond the scope of
this master’s thesis, therefore I omit a numerical analysis here and leave it for later
studies. Due to the ambiguity of the turning point of γ > 1, I will focus in the further
debate exclusively on the case γ = 1.
The effect of ρ on the turning point is independent from ε. The higher the time
preference ρ, the lower the turning point and the system switches away from zero-
abatement. The effect is plausible: The higher the time preference, the smaller is
the shadow price of capital.24 But the smaller λt, the earlier the stage change due to
(45) occurs.
For a and δ the analysis varies. Deriving Y ∗ with respect to a is negative for ε ≥ 1
and positive otherwise. So if the elasticity of substitution of consumption is relatively
high, an increase in the productivity of abatement causes the turning point to shift to
the left. If, however, the substitution of consumption is difficult (ε < 1), then stronger
abatement productivity means that the turning point shifts to the right. There are
two effects on the turning point caused by a change of a. The first one comes from
(45): if a increases, the shadow price at the turning point λ∗ also increases, such
that it is reached quicker. The second affects the initial shadow price λ0 from (49).
The larger a, the larger g. Depending on ε, h becomes larger with g (ε > 1), smaller
(ε < 1) or remains the same (ε = 1). If h is larger, λ0 is smaller and λ∗ is met
quicker. For ε ≥ 1, both effects cause the turning point to be reached quicker. If
24Compare for this (47) and (49).
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(ε < 1), the effects work in the opposite direction and the regime switch occurs later.
In matters of δ the elasticities affect the impact on the turning point even more.
Depending on ε, a higher depreciation rate shifts the turning point inwards, outwards,
or not at all. The explanation requires a look at (49). Let us assume that δ becomes
smaller, then g becomes larger. Depending on ε, h becomes then larger (for ε > 1),
smaller (for ε < 1) or does not change (for ε = 1). If h is larger, then the initial
shadow price λ0 is lower. Hence, the turning point is reached quicker, abatement sets
in earlier and the turning point shifts left.
For z the effects on the turning point are not clear from comparative statics at first
sight. However, these uncertainties can be cleared up easily. If z increases, then the
shadow price at the turning point λ∗ increases too such that the system reaches the
turning point earlier. If ε < 0, ∂Y ∗
∂z
is negative only if h is larger than zero, which
is assumed. Hence, for any ε the stronger the impact of disutility, the lower is the
turning point.
For A, the effects on the turning point are totally unclear. Only for ε = 1 it is sure
that the turning point increases, any other case depends on the parameters. There
are two effects considered with A. If A increases, then g increases causing a change
in λ0 depending on ε (49). Moreover, the larger A, the faster production grows (14).
If ε = 1, the only impact of A is on the production level. Hence, when reaching the
shadow price at S0, Y ∗ is larger if A is larger. However, if ε 6= 1, then the strength
of the single effects depend on the parameters such that a simple statement is not
possible.
Throughout the analysis of the turning point, we find that the elasticities are im-
portant factors for the turning point. The income elasticity of marginal damage ε
plays an important role in determining the income level of the turning point and thus
indirectly also the pollution level at which abatement sets in and degradation declines.
Also, the direction of the parameters’ impacts rely on the value of the elasticities.
However, the elasticities do not affect the rate of improvements nor do they determine
whether improvements themselves occur.
The turning point indicates the moment when abatement begins. But is it also
possible that abatement, once started, ceases again or that an economy never reaches
the turning point? These questions I want to discuss now. Let us first think about of
ending abatement. For this, we must be located in S+ to be able to stop pollution
reduction. Recall from (47) that λt is a strictly monotonic falling function during
stage II. With this information it is obvious that (45) does never become negative
again as the difference is already positive and the subtrahend becomes smaller while
the minuend is constant. Therefore, once in the second stage, the economy remains
there such that abatement never ceases.
To demonstrate that each economy must switch the stages in finite time consider
the steady state loci of the stages with and without abatement with ∂K
∂t
= 0.








Figure 5: Phase diagram: The stage switch









.25 In a phase diagram with {K0, λ} as in Figure 5, both
loci are necessarily downward sloping. However, due to θK = 1
a
> 0, one can see that
λ2t lies always above λ1t . The horizontal line of λ = az indicates the shadow price at
the turing point, the intersection of this horizontal line with λ2t the turning point in
(K∗, λ∗).
For any λ above the horizontal line the system is located in S−, in S+ it is for any
λ below it. Since I assumed that g > 0, the dynamics of λ move the shadow price
below the switching boarder. Thus, for any K0 between 0 and K∗, a λ0 can be found
that carries the starting point (K0, λ0) in finite time t∗ to the turning point. Thus,
any economy starting in stage I must approach the turning point and starts abating.
The optimality of this constructed candidate solution in (K,λ) space, which joins the
first and second stage, can be proven by the sufficiency theorem of Arrow and Kurz
(1977, p. 43-49). First, the candidate solution meets the state/co-state equations.
In stage II, the solution of the state/co-state equations satisfies the TVC. Running
the dynamics of the state/co-state equations in S− backwards in time starting from
the turning point, one can see easily that the projection of λ1t covers all K that
meet 0 < K < K∗. Thus, for any positive initial value of K0, there is a well-defined
candidate solution. Focusing on the locus (K∗, λ∗), one can see that in stage I, θ = 0
is optimal, whereas this holds for θ = θK in stage II. Ergo, the control θ optimises
the Hameltonian H and so does the control C. This concludes the proof with the
sufficiency theorem.
25The superscripts of λit, i ∈ {1, 2} indicate the corresponding stage.
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5 The EKC and Increasing Returns to Scale in Abate-
ment
In this section, the approach of Chapter 4 will be examined in a more general way.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, learning by doing may also lead to increasing
returns to scale (IRS) in abatement. This context was initially discussed in Andreoni
and Levinson (2001), but other scholars picked up the idea (Copeland and Taylor,
2003; Egli and Steger, 2007). Andreoni and Levinson discuss the impact of IRS in
abatement on the EKC in a simple static one-sector model, showing that no other
assumptions are necessary to create a hump-shaped PIR. Copeland and Taylor (2003)
investigate IRS in abatement in a two-sector general equilibrium model, supporting the
weak assumptions for the EKC. While the model of Andreoni and Levinson focuses on
pollution and abatement driven by consumption and environmental effort respectively,
Copeland and Taylor replicate the findings for a production economy. Egli and Steger
(2007) extend the model of Andreoni and Levinson into a dynamic frame.
The source of IRS is not restricted to learning by doing. Andreoni and Levinson
state that IRS in abatement might result from spillover effects or from factory sizes.
Copeland and Taylor argue that the economies of scale are caused by industry-wide
external effects. In the same direction aim Egli and Steger who assume that IRS
result from positive external effects of other abating market participants. However,
these externalities are actually nothing else but spillover effects, hence they are similar
to learning by doing. As Bretschger and Smulders (2007) show for the model of Egli
and Steger (2007), the external effects are the same as an exogenous shift in the
abatement technology. Therefore, they can be treated the same way as if they were
from learning by abating.
In this chapter I discuss the idea of increasing returns to scale in abatement in a
dynamic model following the work of Egli and Steger (2007). For this purpose I first
introduce the static model of Andreoni and Levinson (2001) as the basic framework
for IRS in abatement in order to provide a reference point for the dynamic case.
After that, I set up the dynamic model of Egli and Steger. At first, I present the
problem for the benevolent planner in a general and a specified form. Thereon, I
investigate the determinants of the time path of pollution and of the pollution-income
relationship as well as the turning point. Following this, I discuss the general solution
for a decentralised economy and the corresponding optimal taxation that leads to the
social planner solution. Finally, I analyse in the specified model the determinants of
the PIR and the turning point and the effects of public policy on both features.
5 THE EKC AND INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE IN ABATEMENT 46
5.1 The Framework of the Andreoni and Levinson EKC Model
Firstly, let us set up the model of Andreoni and Levinson (2001) as a benchmark in
the following discussion on IRS in abatement. Their simple static model requires only
very weak conditions for the EKC. They demonstrate that IRS in abatement is the
only necessary feature to create an EKC. No other assumptions on e.g. technological
change, policy institutions or released constraints are needed.
Furthermore, they state that IRS in abatement actually encompass these explanations.
The implementation of abatement after passing a threshold could be justified by the
existence of fixed costs which lead to IRS in abatement. Thinking of the work of
Jones and Manuelli (2001), the fixed costs could arise through the installation of
a capable environmental agency after the regime-switch towards pollution-control.
These costs cause economies of scale from a societal perspective. Also, if abatement
is too costly for the economy before passing the threshold as in Stokey (1998) or
Brock and Taylor (2003, 2005) it might be due to fixed costs in establishing pollution
abatement. Therefore, the IRS model of Andreoni and Levinson can be viewed as a
reduced form of the model of Brock and Taylor presented in Chapter 4.
Preferences
The preferences are similar to those used in the previous chapter. Just as in (2) the
utility function depends on consumption C and pollution P such that
U = U(C,P ), (72)
where consumption has a positive impact on utility UC > 0 and pollution a negative
one UP < 0. Likewise, U is quasiconcave in C and in −P .
Pollution
As before, net pollution is the difference between gross pollution and abatement.
However, it is modelled differently than in the previous chapter. Now, degradation
depends on consumption C and environmental effort E. Again, gross pollution is
assumed to be a by-product of economic activities, but now it results from consump-
tion, not from production. Nevertheless the idea is lucid. Consumption has both a
direct and an indirect impact on the environment. On the one hand, higher levels of
consumption require larger input factors and generate larger amounts of polluting fac-
tors. On the other hand, consumption behaviour and consumers’ choice constitute an
important part of the production-consumption chain, because it is the consumer who
makes the final decision about the purchase of commodities and services (Orecchia
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and Tessitore, 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to think of pollution as a by-product
of consumption.
Abatement results from the resource expenditures of households. The two pos-
sible resources are environmental effort E and consumption C, which affects ef-





describes the effectiveness of environmental effort in improving
environmental quality. Since consumption is the only argument of pollution, we can






The abatement function increases in both arguments C and E such that BC , BE > 0.
As before, it is strictly concave. The coherency between abatement and environmental
effort is intuitively clear: The higher the environmental effort undertaken by market
participants, the higher the level of abatement. Although not that obvious prima
facie, the relationship between abatement and consumption is explained easily too: a
higher consumption level means higher pollution. This in turn implies that in absolute
values the abatement is also higher, or in other words that abatement is more effective.
Hence, abatement increases in both arguments.
Both arguments are essential inputs for abatement such that B(0, E) = B(C, 0) = 0.
Thus, abatement does not exist if there is no environmental effort nor consumption.
Again, this is intuitive for E. For C the indirect way via P is necessary. If there is
no environmental effort, there cannot be any abatement since nobody tries to reduce
pollution. If there is no consumption, then there is no pollution. Since pollution
cannot be negative, zero pollution displays concurrently zero abatement. Applying
this information in (16), the pollution function reads as
P (C,E) = C −B(C,E). (74)
Resource Constraint
Finally, suppose that the endowment for available resources Y is limited to expendi-
tures for consumption C and environmental effort E only such that
Y = C + E. (75)
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Conditions for the EKC
Under two conditions the existence of the EKC is provided in this setting. According
to the first one, "the marginal willingness to pay to clean up the last speck of pollution
does not go to zero as income approaches infinity" (Andreoni and Levinson, 2001, p.
277). This rather weak condition is easily satisfied if pollution abatement is a normal
good. This condition, however, was mentioned already in chapter 2.1: The normality
of environmental quality, which is a synonym for pollution abatement, is sine qua non
for the existence of an EKC (Lieb, 2002).
The second condition requires IRS in abatement in order to produce the inverse-U
shape of the PIR. To demonstrate this, Andreoni and Levinson (2001) define the
utility function as
U(C,P ) = C − zP (76)
and the abatement technology as
B(C,E) = CαEβ (77)
with α, β ∈ (0, 1). Plugging (77) into (74) gives
P (C,E) = C − CαEβ. (78)
Assume for simplicity that z = 1.26 Substituting (78) into (76) gives then
U = C − C + CαEβ = CαEβ. (79)
Using the resource constraint (75), we can replace E such that utility depends only
on C for given Y :
U = Cα(Y − C)β. (80)
The optimal level of consumption can be derived through the first derivative:
26Andreoni and Levinson (2001) show that for z 6= 1 the results remain the same despite higher
complexity.
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∂U
∂C
= αCα−1(Y − C)β − βCα(Y − C)β−1 = 0 (81)
⇔ C∗ = α
α + βY. (82)
Likewise, the optimal level of environmental effort can be derived. For this, replace
C with (Y − E) in (79) and take the first derivative with respect to E:
∂U
∂E
= βEβ−1(Y − E)α − α(Y − E)α−1Eβ = 0 (83)
⇔ E∗ = β
α + βY. (84)
Plugging C∗ and E∗ into (78) we get the optimal PIR:
P ∗(Y ) = C∗ − C∗αE∗β (85)
= α






















It is obvious that the sign of the first derivative depends on the parameters α and
β. When α + β = 1, abating pollution faces constant returns to scale and the first
derivative is constant as Y α+β−1 = 1. For any combination that satisfies α > β, the
minuend is in each ratio larger than the subtrahend, the PIR increases constantly and
monotonically with rising Y . For α < β, the slope of the PIR is negative such that
the PIR decreases constantly with rising Y . For α = β, the first derivate is equal
to zero such that the PIR remains on a constant level for any value of Y . Hence,
the PIR moves constantly and monotonically with rising Y , ergo there is no turning
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From this, one can see that in the case that abatement features diminishing returns
to scale (i.e. if α+β < 1), P ∗(Y ) is convex, whereas in case of increasing returns to
scale in abatement (α+β > 1), P ∗(Y ) is concave. The corresponding graphs of the
three cases are illustrated in Figure 6, where (A) shows the case of constant returns,
(B) the one for diminishing returns and (C) increasing returns to scale. It is clear to








Y ∗ Y ∗
α + β = 1 α + β < 1 α + β > 1
(A) (B) (C)
Figure 6: Optimal pollution-income relationships
As shown above IRS in abatement are crucial for the occurrence of EKC. This requires
that the gross pollution function is linear. In their review on the Andreoni and
Levinson paper, Plassmann and Khanna (2006) criticise the assumed linearity in the
gross pollution function. Revising Andreoni and Levinson (2001), Plassmann and
Khanna allow in a more general setting that the gross production function may exhibit
increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale. Furthermore, they display that,
in fact, the relative magnitudes of returns to scale in abatement and gross pollution
determine the existence of an EKC. It is a sufficient condition for the decline of
pollution if the returns to scale in abatement are larger than the returns to scale
in gross pollution. However, the assumption of a linear gross pollution function is
suitable for pollution in terms of emissions, in contrast to pollution in terms of ambient
concentrations or damage. Since this paper focuses on pollution as a flow variable, it
is most appropriate to model pollution in terms of emissions. Thus, the assumption
of IRS in abatement is in fact the sufficient cause for the EKC (Egli, 2005a).
5.2 The Dynamic Model for the Social Planner
Next, I transfer the ideas of Andreoni and Levinson (2001) into a dynamic frame
following Egli and Steger (2007). Starting with the benevolent planner, I present first
a general dynamic model followed by a specified model that allows one to find the PIR
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and the turning point of the model. The specified model is necessary to investigate
analytically the shape of the PIR and the determinants of the turning point.
5.2.1 The General Dynamic Model
In this subsection, I begin with the general dynamic EKC model of Egli and Steger
(2007). In this model, pollution is a by-product of consumption and it is modelled
as a flow pollutant. Abatement results from expenditures on it in terms of C and
E. The EKC shape results from IRS in abatement. The economy produces one
homogeneous final-output good under constant returns to scale using only capital
(physical and human) as an input factor. Additionally, I consider two economy-
wide external effects that affect the single agent: One negative externality resulting
from consumption C¯ of other market participants and one positive from productive
abatement technology TE. The externality from technological progress results from
learning by doing in abatement.
The economy contains a large number of identical households distributed on the
interval [0,1]. The utility of the representative household increases with consumption
C and decreases with net pollution P . Hence, the corresponding utility function reads
as U(C,P ) with UC > 0, UCC < 0, UP < 0, UPP < 0. Each household can spend
money on consumption C and environmental effort E.
Pollution increases with the representative agent’s consumption and with consumption
of all market participants such that the gross pollution function is G(C, C¯). As
before, effective abatement is again depending on gross pollution and abatement
B(C,E, TE). Note, that abatement contains both the direct environmental effort of
the household and the technological progress in abatement.
In order to avoid negative pollution we must assure that abatement never exceeds
gross pollution. Therefore, effective abatement is
B (C,E, TE) =









< B (C,E, TE) .
(89)
In this setting, pollution can never become negative. This actually is an adequate
attribute of pure flow pollutants (Lieb, 2004; Egli, 2005a).
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where C and E are the control variables, ρ is the time preference and t the time
index. The corresponding constraints are




−B (C,E, TE) (91)
K˙ = F (K)− δK − C − E (92)
K(0) = K0, (93)
where the first constraint is the net pollution function, increasing with gross emissions
and decreasing with abatement activity. The second constraint describes the evolu-
tion of the capital stock K: The capital stock increases with production F (K) and
decreases through depreciation δ and expenditures for C and E. The depreciation
rate is constant and non-negative. The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is
H = U
[
C,P (C, C¯, E, TE
]
+ λ [F (K)− δK − C − E] , (94)
the corresponding state equations are
∂H
∂C
= 0 ⇒ UC + UP (PC + PC¯) = λ (95)
∂H
∂E
= 0 ⇒ UP (PE + PTE) = λ, (96)
where Ux and Pi denote the partial derivatives with respect to x ∈ {C,P} and
i ∈ {C, C¯, E, TE} respectively. The TVC limt→∞ λKe−ρt = 0 must hold. Moreover,
since the interest lies on the EKC, only interior solutions are considered such that
gross pollution is always larger than abatement. It is also assumed that the necessary
conditions are sufficient.
The marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of environmental effort
must equal the shadow price of capital λ along the optimal growth path. Marginal
utility of consumption consists of direct utility from consumption UC and disutility
from pollution UP (PC+PC¯). As the social planner takes all externalities into account,
(95) contains UPPC¯ = UPGC¯ too. Marginal utility of abatement comprises the direct
effects of abatement only. Again, due to the central planner UPPTE = −UPBTE is
included in (96).
The co-state equation is
λ˙− ρλ = −∂H
∂K
⇒ λ˙ = −λ(FK − δ − ρ), (97)
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where FK is the marginal productivity of capital.
5.2.2 Specification of the Dynamic Model
In order to give appropriate solutions for the shape of the PIR we need to specify the
general model. These are provided as follows. Subject of interest lies on defining the
functions for utility, gross pollution, abatement and production. The parameterised
functions are defined by the following system:
U(C,P ) = ln(C − zP ) with z > 0, C ≥ zP (98)
G(C, C¯) = C1−ωC¯ω with 0 < ω < 1 (99)
B(C,E, TE) = CαEβTE with 0 < α, β < 1, α + β = 1 (100)
Y = AK with A > 0. (101)
Equation (98) demonstrates that utility rises with consumption C and falls with
pollution P . The household’s desire for a clean environment is given by z: The lower
z, the lower is the loss of utility through pollution. This implies that the household
benefits relatively more from consumption than from less degradation and hence it
spends less on E and more on C. Since pollution is expected to harm people, z
cannot be negative. Additionally, to avoid negative utility, disutility from pollution
must not exceed utility from consumption.
The gross pollution function (99) includes the internal effect of consumption on gross
pollution C and its external effect C¯, ω defines the output elasticity of C¯, 1− ω the
one of C. Remember that it is most suitable to measure flow pollutants in terms of
emissions. Therefore, a linear gross pollution function is appropriate and ω takes a
value between zero and unity.
Akin to (99), the abatement function (100) refers to both the abatement expenditures
E and productivity effect TE. To capture learning by doing in abatement I assume
a positive link from environmental effort to abatement technology such that TE =
Eη with η ∈ {0, 1}. Abatement depends on C also, because effective abatement
cannot occur without consumption. The coefficients α, β and η are again the output
elasticities of the abatement input factors. Therefore, all take a value between zero
and unity. Since we assume IRS in abatement α + β + η > 1 must be satisfied.
Finally, in (101) I assume that the economy produces one homogeneous final-output
good according to an AK technology.
Since the benevolent planner takes the pollution externality into account, we can set
C and C¯ equal. Given this, the net pollution function as the difference between gross
pollution G(C, C¯) = C and abatement B(C,E, TE) = CαEβ+η is
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Pˆ (C,E) = C − CαEβ+η. (102)
Furthermore, let us start analogue to Andreoni and Levinson such that z = 1. In this














By plugging (101) into (92) and its first order condition into (97) we receive the





+ λ [(A− δ)K − C − E] , (104)
while the corresponding state/co-state equations are
∂H
∂C





= 0 ⇔ E = β + η
λ
(106)
λ˙− ρλ = −∂H
∂K




−ρtλK = 0 (108)
must hold to make the maximisation problem solvable. Since α, β and η are constant,









The time path of pollution and the PIR









, so it is obvious that the growth rate of capital must be





= A− δ − ρ. (110)
Rewriting this we find the current value of capital depending on its initial constant
value and its change over time:
Kt = K0e(A−δ−ρ)t. (111)




= A− δ − C + E
K
= A− δ − ρ = − λ˙
λ
. (112)
From (105) and (106) we know additionally that
C + E = α + β + η
λ
. (113)
Plugging (113) into (112), the current value of the shadow price resolves as
λt =
α + β + η
K0ρ
e−(A−δ−ρ)t. (114)
With this information in hand, we can derive the time path of pollution and the PIR.
For this, plug (105) and (106) into (102) and replace λ according to (114).27 The
pollution time path is then
P˜ (t) = αρK0e
(A−δ−ρ)t




α + β + η
)α ((β + η) ρK0e(A−δ−ρ)t
α + β + η
)β+η
. (115)
For the PIR we need to express pollution in terms of income. To do so, let us define
the consumption rate as c ≡ C
Y
and the "environmental effort rate", i.e. the income
share spent for environmental effort, as b ≡ E
Y
. Replacing C and E in (102) with cY
and bY respectively provides us the PIR:28
27The derivation of P˜ (t) is shown in Appendix A.5.
28This is shown in Appendix A.5.
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P ∗(Y ) = cY − (cY )α (bY )β+η . (116)
Yet, the PIR is not solvable, because b and c are still unknown to us. However, we
can still specify both in terms of parameters only, such that the PIR depends solely
on constant terms. For this, consider again (105) and (106). Applying here (114)
















= (β + η) ρ
A (α + β + η) . (118)
Egli and Steger (2007) provide a graphical simulation of the PIR and the pollution
time path.29 Figure 7 depicts the PIR (left) and the pollution time path (right). The
left figure shows that pollution first rises with growing income, later falls and possibly
becomes zero. It satisfies the humped shape of an EKC due to IRS in abatement.
The PIR represents a balanced growth phenomenon.30 It can be seen that the PIR is
asymmetric with an upper tail that declines relatively gradually. This EKC pattern is
similar to empirical evidence by Grossman and Krueger (1995), who found asymmetric
EKC shapes for different pollutants. The right picture indicates that a lot of time
must pass by until pollution approaches zero again: In the simulation of Egli and
Steger (2007) it takes about 250 years until pollution becomes zero.
The Turning Point
In this section, I want to analyse the determinants of the turning point. I start
assuming z = 1, since closed-form solutions and thus analytical analyses are only
possible for this case. Although it is just a special case of the model, the qualitative
results remain mainly the same as can be seen in numerical analyses. Such numerical
solutions for z < 1 provided by Egli and Steger (2007) will be discussed afterwards.
29The reader can find the baseline set of parameters that is used for the simulation in section 4.3.
of Egli and Steger (2007).
30This is surprising at first glance, because a balanced growth phenomenon requires by definition
that pollution grows at a constant rate what it clearly does not. However, pollution is an expression
of its inputs C and E, which do grow at a constant rate. Therefore, the PIR represents a balanced
growth phenomenon.
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Figure 7: P ∗(Y ) and P˜ (t) with IRS in abatement, source: Egli and Steger (2007)
For analysing the turning point we need to take the first differential of (115) and of
(116) in order to obtain the turning point in terms of time and in terms of income
respectively. The calculation of both differentials is given in Appendix A.5. Differen-
tiating P (t) with respect to t gives the time at which pollution reaches it maximum
t∗:
t∗ = − ln
[
Kα+β+η−10 α
α−1 (β + η)β+η (α + β + η)2−α−β−η ρα+β+η−1
]
(α + β + η − 1) (A− δ − ρ) (119)
At the moment t∗, pollution reaches its peak level after which it decreases again.
It is determined by all parameters but z and ω. However, this is not surprising due
to the assumption of z = 1 and C = C¯ which eliminate the two parameters in the
model. Differentiating P (Y ) with respect to Y gives us the turning point of the PIR
independent from time:
Y ∗ = Aα
1−α
α+β+η−1 (β + η)−
β+η





It is worth noting that Y ∗ is the equivalent to the solution of Andreoni and Levinson
(2001). It is determined by the marginal product of capital A, the time preference ρ,
the elasticities of consumption in abatement α, and environmental effort in abatement
β and η. However, the depreciation rate δ and the initial value K0 do not affect the
turning point.
The comparative static results for the turning point of Y ∗ are listed in Table 331,
their calculation is demonstrated in Appendix A.6. An increase in A rises Y ∗, hence
the turning point appears at a higher level of income. A higher value of A allows for
larger capital accumulation such that more capital can be spent for C and E. For
31In order to simplify the notation in the table, I define σ ≡ α+ β + η.
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Table 3: Comparative static results for Y ∗
∂K∗
∂x
for x ∈ {A, ρ, α, β, η, δ}
A Y ∗ 1
A
> 0
ρ Y ∗ −1
ρ
< 0
α Y ∗ (σ−1)(−α+β+η)+ασ(ln[σ]+(β+η)(ln[β+η]−ln[α]))
ασ(σ−1)2 ?
β Y ∗ 2+σ(ln[σ]−2)+σ(α−1)(ln[α]−ln[β+η])
σ(σ−1)2 ?
η Y ∗ 2+σ(ln[σ]−2)+σ(α−1)(ln[α]−ln[β+η])
σ(σ−1)2 ?
δ 0 0
Note: σ ≡ α+ β + η
easier interpretation of this result, imagine that α = β + η such that C = E. In this
case, pollution depends only on consumption and the effects can be analysed simply
with the exponents of (116). By comparing to (117), it is obvious that a larger A
causes c to fall. However, the smaller c, the larger level of income Y is required to
make pollution reaching its maximum.
The second results shows that the higher ρ, the smaller Y ∗ is. The logic is straight
forward: The higher ρ, the more important is the future for the agent’s current utility.
Thus, the more valuable the environmental quality of the future, the larger are the
abatement activities to avoid pollution such that the turning point shifts inwards. To
demonstrate this, consider again that α = β + η. As ρ rises, c rises too, which in
turn means a lower Y to reach the turning point in the updated equation (116).
The impact of the elasticities of consumption α and environmental effort β and η on
the turning point are not clear. The first derivatives of (120) with respect to α and β
depend on the chosen values of α, β and η. However, the static model would suggest
that the stronger the economies of scale, the earlier is the turning point (cf. (87)).
Ergo, the derivatives with respect to α, β and η should be all negative. Furthermore,
as we will see in the next subsection, Egli and Steger (2007) solved the problem
numerically and find that α, β and η have a negative effect on the turning point. An
increase in the degree if IRS in abatement ergo causes a higher abatement output for
each level of income, which in turn means a lower turning point.
5.3 The Dynamic Model in the Decentralised Economy
Up to now, I have considered only the case of a social planner, and have ignored
the idea of market economy. However, analysing only the social planner solution
is far from reality. Market imperfections are neglected and hence public policy is
not necessary as demonstrated in Chapter 4. The need for public policy however
has been shown already by Andreoni and Levinson (2001). In their static model,
they show that in a scenario with many consumers the market solution leads to
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higher consumption and to smaller abatement than in the social optimum. Hence
the unregulated economy is inefficient and public policy for correction needed. This
clearly contradicts the statement of Brock and Taylor (2003, 2005).
Therefore, I will elaborate the thought of Andreoni and Levinson in the frame of Egli
and Steger (2007). Starting with their general model, I will investigate the differences
between the market solution and the one of the central planner. From there, I will
derive the optimal tax that corrects these differences. Finally, I will analyse in the
specified model the effects on the PIR, the determinants of the turning point and the
cost effectiveness of public policies. For this, I will consult the numerical calculations
of Egli and Steger.
5.3.1 The General Model
The foundations in the decentralised economy model are mainly the same is in the
social planner model. The differences are concerning the capital accumulation. The
households increase their capital stock through lending capital where r denotes the
rental price for one unit of K. Gross expenditures for consumption and environmental
effort are (1−τC)C and (1−τE)E, where τi with i ∈ {C,E} is a tax (or a subsidy for
negative values of τi) on C or E respectively. The tax revenues T are redistributed
to the household in a lump-sum manner. Moreover, T comprises all taxes such that
T = τCC + τEE.











−B (C,E, TE) (122)
K˙ = rK − (1 + τC)C − (1 + τE)E + T (123)
K(0) = K0, (124)
where net pollution is the difference between gross pollution and abatement, it has
the same attributes as in the social planner’s problem. K˙ is the rate of change of K
in period t increasing with revenues from lending capital and the redistribution of the
taxes and decreasing with gross expenditures on C and E. Again, K0 denotes the
initial capital stock.
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is then
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H = U [C,P (C, C¯, E, TE)] + λ[rK − (1 + τC)C − (1 + τE)E + T ], (125)
the state equations according to Pontryagin’s principle are
∂H
∂C
= 0 ⇒ UC + UPPC1 + τC = λ (126)
∂H
∂E
= 0 ⇒ UPPE1 + τE = λ, (127)
and the co-state equation is
λ˙ = −∂H
∂K
⇒ λ˙ = −λ(r − ρ). (128)
Again, the TVC must hold and I assume that the necessary conditions are sufficient.
(126) indicates that the private marginal utility of consumption corrected by τC must
equal λ. Similarly, from (127) we see that the private marginal utility of environmen-
tal effort corrected by τE must equal λ, too. Equation (128) demonstrates that the
shadow price disappears at rate r− ρ > 0. The representative firm produces one ho-
mogenous final-output good with capital as single input. The production technology
is Y = AK, thus it has CRS. Capital loses value with a constant depreciation rate
δ. When maximising the output, the interest rate must equal the difference between
the accretion of output and its depreciation, hence r = A− δ.
For the ease of interpretation it is helpful to imply some simplifications. Suppose
that there are zero taxes such that τC = τE = 0. Comparing (126) of the market
economy with (95) of the benevolent planner it is obvious that the marginal utility of
the external effect of consumption is missing. Likewise, (127) excludes the externality
from productive abatement technology. Thus, without regulation the private agent
ignores the external consequences of C¯ and TE.
The exclusion of the externalities changes the agents behaviour in the market solution.
To see this, let us compare (95) and (126) and suppose that λ is constant. Then it
is clear that the marginal utility of consumption in the centralised economy is larger
than in the market economy as UPPC¯ < 0. Since diminishing marginal benefit of
consumption is assumed, we can conclude that consumption in the market economy
exceeds consumption in the centralised economy.
Similarly, comparing (96) and (127) and holding λ constant, it is obvious that the
marginal utility of environmental effort in the centralised economy is smaller than
in the market economy too as UPPTE > 0. Hence, environmental effort is larger
in the social planner case due to the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of
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environmental effort. All in all, in the unregulated market economy C is too high and
E is too low compared to the centralised economy. However, as will be discussed
next the implementation of public policy can remedy the oblivion of the externalities.
5.3.2 Optimal Taxation
In order to neutralise the imperfections of the market solution demonstrated by the
differences between the decentralised and centralised economy, the government can
regulate the market by implementing taxes and subsidies. The optimal tax scheme
is obtained if the government sets the taxes such that the tax absorbs the external
effect completely. For this purpose, one can equate (126) and (127) to (95) and (96)
and solve for τC and τE respectively. The results are:
τC* = − UPPC¯
UC + UP (PC + PC¯)
> 0 (129)
τE* = − PTE
PE + PTE
< 0 (130)
Equation (129) demonstrates that the optimal tax on consumption equals the ratio of
the marginal external effect of consumption on utility UPPC¯ and the sum of private
and marginal consumption effect on utility UC + UP (PC + PC¯). Analogously, the
optimal tax on environmental effort is the ratio of the marginal external effect of
environmental effort on pollution PTE and the total marginal effect of environmental
effort on pollution PE + PTE .
From the utility function it is known that UC > 0 and UP < 0, i.e. utility increases
with higher consumption and decreases with higher pollution. Similarly, from the
abatement function we know that PC > 0, PC¯ > 0, PE < 0 and PTE < 0. Applying
this information to the taxation equations, one finds that τC* > 0 and that τE* < 0.
Hence, in the optimal case, the government levies taxes on consumption, but grants
subsidies to environmental effort.
The consequences of taxation on the representative household’s decisions can be
explained in a simple example. Consider again as a starting point that τC = τE = 0.
Let the government introduce a consumption tax τC > 0, the left hand side of
equation (126) decreases. Holding λ constant requires that the marginal utility of
consumption increases. As consumption faces falling marginal utility, an increasing
marginal utility implies that the level of consumption drops. Hence, implementing a
consumption tax reduces the household’s level of polluting consumption.
Similarly, the household reacts on the implementation of a subsidy on environmental
effort, ergo changing the subsidy to τE < 0. This leads to a rise of the left hand side of
(127). Again, λ needs to be constant such that the marginal utility of environmental
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effort must increase in order to compensate the change. This in turn means according
to diminishing marginal utility that the actual level of environmental effort increases.
Thus, a subsidy for environmental effort increases the amount the representative
household spends for abatement.
5.3.3 Numerical Analysis of the Specified Model
Egli and Steger (2007) solve the specified model of the market economy numerically.32
They investigate the dependence of Y ∗ on the model parameters in order to describe
the effects on the PIR and the turning point. Additionally, the cost-effectiveness
of different policy regimes is under study. Unlike the analytical approach to the
social planner’s problem, now various values of z are considered. Furthermore, the
examination includes the analysis of an unregulated economy and of a semi-regulated,
because those two cases are believed to describe the real world best.
Egli and Steger find several interesting outcomes. First, the shape of the PIR remains
the same as in the centralised economy. However, this is not surprising since also in
the market economy there are IRS in abatement. But as the effects of C¯ are not
taken into account in the unregulated case, C chosen by the agent is higher than in
the social economy. For the same reason, expenditures for E are too low. Therefore,
the EKC of the unregulated economy is larger in magnitude than in the economy of
the benevolent planner.
In terms of the imperfectly regulated economy, the magnitude of the PIR is somewhere
between the extreme cases. This is because the intervention causes lower consumption
and higher abatement effort than in the unregulated case, but the imperfect policies
cannot reduce C or raise E such that the level of the perfectly regulated economy is
reached. Both results are in line with the findings of Andreoni and Levinson (2001).
In order to find the determinants of the turning point, Egli and Steger calculated
numerically the elasticities of Y ∗ with respect to different model parameters such
that ∆Y ∗/Y ∗∆x/x with x ∈ {A, ρ, α, β, η, ω, z}. This has been done for z = 1 and z < 133
and for an unregulated and an imperfectly regulated economy. Doing so, Egli and
Steger find that the results for z = 1 are qualitatively the same as for z < 1. In
both cases, all elasticities have the same sign, i.e. apart from varying in strength
all parameters keep the same effects. The same holds for the unregulated and semi-
regulated economy.
The effect of each parameter on the turning point is the same regardless whether there
is environmental regulation. This can be seen in Table 4. Furthermore, from Table 4
32For details in results and approach please compare Egli and Steger (2007).
33The case z > 1 is omitted since a higher value of z increases the disutility from P and thus
increases the willingness to abate. Therefore, using z = 1 as a benchmark, the case of z > 1 is not
interesting for the discussion of the effectiveness of public policy.
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Table 4: Numerical elasticities of Y ∗ with respect to model parameters
A ρ α β η ω z
unregulated economy > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
semi-regulated economy > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
we can see that the analytical results of the centralised economy are confirmed. A
has a positive impact on the turning, whereas the opposite is true for ρ. Also, the
ambiguous results for α, β and η are determined as negative. Moreover, the impact
of z itself on the turning point is throughout negative. This result is not surprising
because z measures the impact of pollution on utility. The larger z, the higher the
disutility of pollution and the higher is the willingness to abate. Hence, the household
chooses lower consumption and higher abatement which leads to a smaller EKC with
a lower turning point. Finally, in the numerical approach the effects of η and ω are
ascertainable. Egli and Steger find that ω has a positive impact on the turning point,
whereas the effect of η is negative. Again, the turning point is independent from δ
as in the centralised economy.
The interpretation of the effect of ω is straight forward. From (99) we know that ω
indicates the strength of C¯ on gross pollution. Since in neither the unregulated nor
the semi-regulated case the external effect is entirely internalised as with the central
planner, an increase in ω implies higher gross pollution at any level of income. This
is equivalent to an outward shift of the EKC, the turning point moves to a higher
level of income.
The interpretation of η is slightly more complex, but nevertheless straight forward.
Two effects occur with a change in η, a substitution effect and a scale effect. First,
the larger the impact of the external effect on abatement, the lower is the agent’s
environmental effort. To see this, suppose that β + η is constant: In the centralised
economy no change is caused by a variation of η, because the total degree of IRS
remains the same. However, increasing η means a reduction of β, wherefore in the
decentralised economy E will be lower, causing a shift of the turning point to a higher
income level. Thus, the stronger the external effect in abatement, the more it crowds
out each household’s abatement activity. This is the substitution effect.
The scale effect is the overall higher abatement due to a larger η. To see this, consider
now that β is constant. Then a rise of η increases the degree of IRS in abatement,
implying that pollution has a smaller value for each level of income – the EKC shifts
inwards. Since the calculated elasticities of η are always negative, the scale effect
clearly dominates the substitution effect causing a lower turning point. Combining
the effects of α, β and η, it is clear that the degree of IRS in abatement has a large
negative impact on the turning point.
Finally, Egli and Steger discuss the cost effectiveness of public policies. In a scenario
with a maximum level of pollution which must not be exceeded, the scholars compare
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the effects of a subsidy on environmental effort τE and a consumption tax τC . They
find that the consumption tax leads at any time to lower pollution levels than the
abatement subsidy. However, the abatement subsidy does not reduce consumption as
much as the consumption tax. Egli and Steger argue that the welfare gain from higher
consumption from the subsidy outnumbers the negative effect of higher pollution.
Therefore, they conclude that the subsidy is preferable at any time.
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6 Comparison of the Models
So far, two approaches to model the EKC from learning by doing in abatement
were presented. However, it has not yet been discussed whether the models vary in
conclusions and predictions. This section focuses on comparing the properties of the
models. It will be examined in which matter the models provide the same results and
where they differ from each other. Furthermore, their fit to empirical findings from
reality should be under study. The aim is to analysis whether general conclusions can
be drawn from the models and if so, what they are.
First, the predictions of the models of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are compared. Special
attention is paid to the turning point and the effectivity of environmental policy with
regard to the EKC. Next, I analyse how the models are compatible with empirical
regularities on growth and the environment other than those presented in Chapter 2.
Furthermore, the conformity of the models with other shapes of the PIR for flow pol-
lutants will be evaluated. Thereupon, I examine the empirical evidence of economies
of scale in abatement. Finally, I analyse the models with respect to negative pollu-
tion. Models with pollution modelled as the difference between gross pollution and
abatement might suffer from negative pollution in the long run. I discuss whether
this holds for the models used and if so how to avoid this problem.
6.1 Model Predictions
The models provide significant information about the turning point of the EKC and
the effectiveness of environmental policy. The predictions are not completely identical.
While the turning point analysis notes mainly the same results in both models, the
statements about public policy differ substantially.
In order to compare the results of both models, we must restrict the analysis of
Table 2 on ε = γ = 1, hence on the first column. This has several reasons. First, the
model of Chapter 5 considers only elasticities equal to unity (cf. (98)). Ergo, for any
other elasticities the models and thus their predictions are not comparable. Second,
a discussion of γ > 1 is not expedient since empirical evidence finds that demand
for environmental quality is not a luxury good (cf. Chapter 3.1) such that γ ≯ 1.
Therefore, the restriction to ε = γ = 1 in Table 2 is reasonable.
The models are quite consistent in matters of the turning point analysis. For ε =
γ = 1, both models predict the same effects of the determinants of the turning point.
An increase in the factor productivity A shifts the turning point to a higher level of
income. This is because income grows larger before abatement reduces pollution.
Hence, the turning point shifts to the right. The discount factor ρ and the pollution
intensity factor z have in both models a degrading effect on the turning point. The
higher the time preference, the more important is present utility to the household and
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the more eager it is to spend resources on abatement. The stronger pollution harms
utility, the sooner the household tries to reduce pollution.
The same holds for the strength of abatement. In Brock and Taylor (2003), the
strength of abatement is measured through a, whereas in Egli and Steger (2007) the
degree of IRS in abatement defines the magnitude of abatement (i.e. α, β and η).
In both cases, the stronger the abatement technology to reduce pollution, the lower
is the turning point of the EKC. In both approaches, a change of the depreciation
rate δ does not influence the turning point. However, the models also produce
unambiguous results. For instance, as Brock and Taylor (2003) do not consider a
negative externality in gross pollution, ω – the elasticity of external gross pollution –
cannot be compared.
It should not be forgotten that the income elasticities of consumption and pollution
are strongly linked to the turning point analysis. It can be seen from Table 2 that
the elasticities have a non-negligible impact on the determinants of the turning point.
Therefore, the consistency of the models depends completely on the elasticities. If
they change, the results may not be uniform anymore. Hence, a general statement
about the impact directions is not possible.
Despite the consistency in the turning point analysis, the predictions of the models
are not uniform in all dimensions. In matters of environmental policy, the models
draw very different conclusions. Brock and Taylor (2003, 2005) claim that public
policy does not have any direct impact on the EKC, the hump-shaped PIR occurs
without the existence of regulation. It is only needed to enforce full abatement after
switching to the full-abatement regime. Also the IRS approach suggests prima facie
that the EKC arises anyway without intervention of the government.
However, Brock and Taylor only consider the social planner’s problem and hence they
neglect the possibility of market failures. Thus, public policy is not required to rule
out these failures. The IRS approach in contrast does not ignore the possibility of
market failures. Instead, Andreoni and Levinson (2001) and Egli and Steger (2007)
demonstrate that the market economy is inefficient in comparison with the social
planner: Both studies show that the magnitude of the EKC is larger in the market
economy. Egli and Steger even specify that subsidies for abatement are preferable to
taxing polluting activities. Hence, environmental policy is necessary to correct this
error. This proves Brock and Taylor wrong.
6.2 Other Empirical Regularities
Both models describe a pollution path first increasing and later decreasing as it is
found in the empirical EKC literature discussed in Chapter 2.4. However, producing
this outcome only is insufficient to describe reality adequately. Therefore, other
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empirical regularities concerning economic growth and the environment should be
satisfied too in order to confirm the propriety of the EKC model.
Based on US-data for 1950-2001, Brock and Taylor (2010) show that the emission
intensities, i.e. emissions per output (or P
Y
) are declining for several pollutants over
time. This is visualised in Figure 8. Beginning from 1948, Brock and Taylor report
this for several short living pollutants (SO2, NOX, VOC, CO and particular matters
PM1034) and for CO2 as a long living pollutant. However, the information concerning
the short living substances is more important for this contribution than the information
about CO2.
The model of Brock and Taylor (2003, 2005) produces this pattern along the balanced
growth path. To see this, consider the model after crossing the threshold. Abatement
sets in and reduces pollution rapidly, while output is still growing. Obviously the model
exaggerates this relationship if abatement is changed immediately to its maximum:
Then P becomes quickly zero. However, since the idea of the model is to simplify
the reality, the magnitude of the effect is a minor concern as long as the direction is
the same. Furthermore, when θ approaches θK over time, then P decreases slowly
but steadily and the emission intensities become steadily smaller. This is consistent
with the empirical findings.
In the model of Egli and Steger (2007), emission intensities follow this pattern, too.
The higher Y , the more the households can spend on C and E, hence both increase.
Expenditures in E increase total abatement, spendings in C give raise to both gross
pollution and abatement. Because of IRS in abatement but CRS in gross pollution, the
economies of scale in abatement exceed those in gross pollution such that abatement
increases more than gross pollution. Hence, P grows slower than Y and the emission
intensity falls.
The second stylised fact reported by Brock and Taylor refers to the findings of Vogan
(1996) concerning the expenditures for pollution abatement per dollar of GDP over
the period 1972-1994. The results are presented in Figure 9. It is shown that the
share of spendings on abatement rises rapidly until 1975 and remains fairly constant
afterwards between 1.6% and 1.8 %.
To test if the model of Brock and Taylor (2003) satisfies constant costs of abatement,
consider again the balanced growth path, i.e. the system after the threshold. The
expenditures for abatement in the maximum are θK = Y A
Y G
which is a constant fraction
of total output. Hence, in the steady state the model implies that the expenditures
for abatement relative to GDP are constant over time.
The same attribute can be found in the model of Egli and Steger (2007). To see this,
recall equation (118). There we can see that the ratio of environmental effort to GDP
depends on parameters only. Hence, there are no dynamic changes over time and
34PM10 is equal to SPM.
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Figure 8: Emission intensities, 1948-1998, source: Brock and Taylor (2010)
Figure 9: Pollution abatement costs, 1972-1994, source: Brock and Taylor (2010)
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the fraction remains constant. Thus, this model is also consistent with the empirical
evidence.
Finally, let us see if the models conform with Kaldor’s facts (Kaldor, 1961). Since
both models apply AK growth technology with pollution, they are both compatible
with most of these stylised facts. For both, the per capita growth rate of output is
positive and constant. Also, capital per capita grows over time. Additionally, the
capital-output ratio is constant and the real rate of return to capital is constant,
too.35 Hence, both discussed dynamic models satisfy all the regularities concerning
economic growth and the environment equally.
6.3 Other Shapes of the PIR
In Chapter 2.4 we have seen that the EKC is not the only possible shape of the PIR.
Also monotonically increasing functions or N-shapes were found. Both patterns are
in contradiction to sustainable growth since in the long run pollution is increasing
again with economic growth. Besides the hump-shaped PIR, the N-shaped PIR is
often found for flow pollutants. Thus, I will analyse now if the models of concern are
able to also produce an N-shaped PIR.
Starting again with Brock and Taylor (2003), we can see that this model is actually
able to cope with N-shapes. To see this, we must allow for a small change in the
setting of the model. Suppose that maximal abatement does not reduce pollution
completely but slightly less such that θK < 1
a
. After crossing the threshold, abatement
begins and pollution decreases. However, it can never disperse emissions completely
such that at Y ∗ pollution falls to a lower level. Thereafter, pollution increases again
with economic growth at a lower rate. (23) demonstrates this effect: pollution can
only become zero if θK = 1
a
. If it is smaller, then pollution increases with economic
growth endlessly.
Figure 10 illustrates this outcome for both cases discussed in Chapter 4. In (A), abate-
ment switches immediately to its maximum, whereas in (B) abatement approaches
θK over time. In (A), abatement sets in at Y ∗ such that the emissions drop to a
lower level. But since θK is too small to eliminate pollution completely, emissions
continue to grow at lower rate on a lower level. In (B), we can observe the same
if θ approaches θK . At the threshold Y ∗, abatement sets in and becomes gradually
stronger as θ becomes larger. However, once θK is reached, pollution starts to in-
crease again with growing income because θK < 1
a
. Hence, both cases of Brock and
Taylor (2003) produce an N-shaped PIR for any θK < 1
a
.
Also the model of Egli and Steger (2007) is compatible with the N-shaped PIR. To
35Both models do not say anything whether the capital and labour income shares are constant
nor do they give information about real growth of wages, the remaining Kaldor facts.







Figure 10: N-shaped PIR of the threshold model
see this, suppose first that the unregulated market economy is located in the upward
sloping branch of the EKC. Let at some point the economy change to a regulated
economy. As discussed before, we know that the PIR of any regulated economy has a
smaller magnitude than in the unregulated economy. Therefore, the implementation
of policy instruments shifts the EKC downwards and pollution diminishes. Provided
that the economy is still below the turning point of the regulated economy, pollution
starts to increase again. Thus, the installation of regulation results in an N-shaped
PIR.
However, the N-shaped outcome is just valid at first glance. In fact, the economy
experiences another turning point due to IRS in abatement. This second turning point
is equal to the original turning point of the regulated economy. Thus, the economy
actually faces an M-shaped PIR where the first turning point is policy induced, the
subsequent rise in pollution is caused by polluting economic growth and the second
turning point results from IRS in abatement. The M-shaped PIR is illustrated in
Figure 11.
The implications of an M-shaped PIR are sweeping. In contrast to the N-shape,
the M-shape implies that sustainable growth is actually possible. From the moment
when the growth in abatement exceeds the larger emissions in the regulated economy,
pollution will never rise again. Nevertheless, the N-shaped PIR is still possible if the
returns to scale in abatement does not exceed unity. Then the second turning point
does not exist. This would be the same as in Brock and Taylor (2003) discussed
above.
Empirical evidence for an M-shaped PIR is rare. The only research so far providing
evidence for an M-shaped EKC pattern is by Giles and Mosk (2003) using long-run
data on methane emissions for New Zealand. However, the scarcity of empirical
evidence does not exclude the M-shaped PIR from being possible since the finding
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Figure 11: M-shaped PIR for IRS in abatement
of N-shaped PIR does not necessarily mean that there will not be a second turning
point: It simply might have not been experienced yet in the investigated economies
such that they are still on the second rising branch of the M-shaped PIR.
6.4 Empirical Evidence for Increasing Returns to Scale in Abate-
ment
IRS in abatement is the major driver of the EKC in the model of Egli and Steger
(2007). However, it is not apparent whether the assumption of IRS is reasonable
in reality. Hence, empirical evidence should confirm the validity of the hypothesis.
IRS in abatement have rarely been subject to empirical investigations. Andreoni
and Levinson (2001) report empirical evidence for IRS in abatement on plant and
US-state level. Analysing the cost efficiency of coal-fired boilers, they find that the
average abatement costs decline with the size of the boiler. Furthermore, Andreoni
and Levinson examine data on abatement costs across US-states and industries. They
show that the size of the industry affects the abatement costs negatively. This result
they find across states, across industries and over time. Those are clearly indications
for IRS in abatement since on a large scale abatement is less costly than on a small
scale.
Similar results are obtained by Maradan and Vassiliev (2005). They discover for CO2
that the marginal opportunity costs of abatement decline with increasing per capita
GDP on nationwide level. If the marginal opportunity costs diminish with income,
then abatement is more efficient at higher income. This is synonymous to IRS in
abatement. Other scholars inspect the existence of IRS in abatement directly. Managi
(2006) investigates the environmental risk in the US agricultural sector between 1970
and 1997. Testing for economies of scales in abatement, he discovers that there
are indeed IRS in abatement. Managi and Kaneko (2009) find evidence for IRS in
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abatement effort analysing data on the Chinese secondary industry on province level
for the period of 1992-2003.
The results of these studies favour the assumption of IRS in abatement. This provides
clear support for the models of Andreoni and Levinson (2001) and Egli and Steger
(2007). However, it is an indirect support for Brock and Taylor (2003) too and thus
also for learning by doing in abatement. Recall that the IRS in abatement model
is a reduced form of Brock and Taylor’s threshold model. The implementation of
abatement at the threshold carries high fixed costs which can be seen synonymously
as IRS in abatement. Thus, although Brock and Taylor assume CRS in abatement
the implementation costs the costs of introduction work as a mark up to the returns
to scale, hence there are IRS. Therefore, the discovery of Maradan and Vassiliev
(2005) does not contradict the assumptions of Brock and Taylor. Also, the results
of Maradan and Vassiliev are not in contradiction with the assumption of increasing
marginal abatement costs on firm level as reported by Cofala and Syri (1998), because
Maradan and Vassiliev’s findings are on aggregate level. Hence, the empirical evidence
of IRS in abatement suits both model approaches.
6.5 Negative Pollution
Growth models concerning the EKC often face problems with negative pollution.
This happens when, in the long run, more pollution is abated than was actually
created. Usually, the problem of negative pollution appears very late in the model.
Nevertheless, if a model contradicts logic or natural facts in the long run, it is doubtful
whether this model produces reliable results in the short and medium run (Egli,
2005a). Considering solely interior solutions for instance (e.g. Selden and Song,
1995; Andreoni and Levinson, 2001) is not fully satisfying due to eventual conflict.
In order to circumvent negative pollution one could apply a non-negativity constraint.
However, Egli (2005a) demonstrates that this technical solution is insufficient. To
see this, let us recall the static IRS model and its pollution function (74). The
non-negativity constraint for pollution requires that36
P (C,E) ≥ 0. (131)
Suppose both C and E grow over time. Under the assumption of IRS in abatement,
net pollution becomes sooner or later negative and the constraint becomes bind-
ing. But at that point, C and E cannot be chosen independently anymore: When
P (C,E) = 0 is reached, the choice of E must be such that abatement does not
exceed gross pollution. Hence, E becomes a function of C. This however contradicts
36In the dynamic model, the constraint is given in (89).
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the independent choice of C and E, a fundamental assumption of the model. Thus,
the non-negativity constraint of pollution is an insufficient solution to avoid negative
pollution.
The Kindergarten Rule model of Brock and Taylor (2003) does not suffer from neg-
ative pollution. There, the use of pollution intensities in the gross pollution function
helps to circumvent the problem. However, according to Egli (2005a) this is not
because of the general correctness of using intensities but rather due to adequate
modelling by Brock and Taylor. Intensities are not a universal remedy against nega-
tive pollution.
Negative pollution occurs especially in models with IRS in abatement, but empirical
evidence favours the existence of IRS in abatement. Egli (2005a) tries to solve this
contradiction with fading IRS in abatement. The idea is that at a low stage of the
PIR, the abatement technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. However, the
larger the abatement activity is, the less effective is the pollution control. The scale
factor becomes less and less and approaches constant returns to scale (CRS) in the
long run. This mechanism is demonstrated in Figure 12. Gross pollution increases
linearly with the polluting activity. Abatement technology exhibits IRS at low levels
of abatement, but the economies of scale diminish the larger abatement is. In the
long run, abatement approaches a non-negative constant.
Figure 12: Fading IRS in abatement, source: Egli (2005a)
Besides the obviation of negative pollution, there are a number of other reasons
supporting the concept of fading IRS. First, it is in line with empirical findings of IRS
in abatement as presented in Chapter 6.4. Moreover, although Managi and Kaneko
(2009) find evidence for IRS in abatement, they doubt that these are durable in the
long run. They rather expect them to be be short-run results. Hence, indirectly they
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propose that IRS in abatement fade away.
Second, if learning by doing is the main drive behind the EKC, it is very likely that the
growth of abatement effectiveness will not be constant over time. The potential gains
will rather decline with cumulative activity as it is typically shown in learning curves.
Bramoullé and Olson (2005) report that learning lessens potential cost reductions for
infant technology more than for mature technology. Comparing the learning rates
of different technologies in the energy sector, McDonald and Schrattenholzer (2001)
find that for data on later technology, the learning rates are systematically lower.
Third, if the degree of IRS diminishes, pollution declines smoothly towards zero, not
rapidly with a kink when reaching zero-pollution as in the case of constant IRS. This
is clear from Figure 12. There, abatement moves steadily closer to gross pollution
such that the difference diminishes. If IRS were constant, the abatement function
would cross gross pollution from below causing a sharp break when zero-pollution is
reached. Egli (2005a) illustrates this with data on SO2 for Switzerland between 1950
and 1989. There, the rate at which emission decline decreases such that reduction
slows down. The deceleration of emission reduction describe precisely the smoothing
effect of fading IRS.
Fourth, fading IRS in abatement is also consistent with the EKC. To demonstrate
this, Egli (2005a) revised the specific model of Egli and Steger (2007) using fading
IRS in abatement. The adjusted pollution function
P = C − CαE1−α+ 11+E2 (132)
replaces (102). The second part of the exponent of E causes the shrinkage of IRS. In
the long run 11+E2 approaches zero such that in the limit there is CRS in abatement.
Simulating the model numerically, Egli demonstrates that the PIR has the proper EKC-
shape while pollution remains non-negative. However, he admits that the restraint of
the degree of IRS must be specified adequately to produce a hump-shaped PIR.
It is not too far-fetched to conclude that the impact of the determinants on the turning
point is the same in the fading-IRS model as previously discussed. However, this would
go too far because Egli’s model does not provide any information about the turning
point. Furthermore, it is not possible to solve it analytically. Therefore, it is not clear
whether the turning point is affected by the same parameters as in Egli and Steger
(2007). But solving the model numerically in order to receive information about the
turning point goes beyond the scope of this master’s thesis. It is left to future research
to gain information in this matter. Concluding, Egli (2005a) demonstrates that fading
IRS is indeed a reasonable approach to the EKC as it eliminates the problem of IRS
in abatement and the possibility of negative pollution. However, since his model still
relies on accurate modelling to obtain the EKC, it cannot be seen as universally valid.
Further research into this direction should clarify the suitability of the concept.
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7 Conclusion
The aim of this research was to help understanding the Environmental Kuznets Curve
and its relevance. The study starts with a critical review of the empirical approach
and the theoretical explanations for the EKC. I find that the EKC is valid mainly for
local, short living air pollutants as SO2 or NOX. For global, long living air pollutants
such as CO2 the results are ambiguous, rather proclaiming that the PIR for CO2 is a
monotonic increasing function. Additionally, it is revealed that the applied estimation
techniques often exhibit substantial defects. Therefore, the produced results may be
based on miscalculations such that the EKC remains only as a data phenomenon.
The theoretical explanations are manifold. Structuring the attempts as de Bruyn and
Heintz (1999), there are five different possibilities for the EKC: behavioural changes,
institutional changes, technological progress, structural change and international re-
allocation. However, only technological progress remains without doubt as an expla-
nation. Behavioural and institutional change rely on technological progress to impose
the adjusted desire for a cleaner environment, structural change itself cannot explain
the EKC and needs the shift of dirty production abroad. But migration is usually not
rapid enough to explain the EKC through the reduction of the absolute production
level in the corresponding industries of a developed country. This contribution pays
attention to the effects of technological progress on the EKC, namely the impact of
learning by doing in the abatement sector. This is done because according to em-
pirical research learning by doing is more important in the improvement process of
abatement technique than R&D.
Yet, theoretical work on the EKC is scarce. This gap I endeavour to fill with my
contribution. I discuss two approaches in modelling learning by doing by abatement
in a dynamic growth model in order to describe the origin of the EKC and to make
general conclusions about it and its determinants possible. In the first model, learning
by doing in abatement leads to constant returns to abatement on the aggregate level
of the economy, it is a so called threshold model. In the first stage, the marginal util-
ity of capital exceeds the marginal disutility of pollution such that the representative
household is not interested in reducing the environmental pressure. The focus lies
completely on the accumulation of capital implying economic growth and rising pol-
lution. At the turning point, the relationship between marginal utilities of capital and
pollution switch: now each unit of pollution affects utility more than an additional
unit of consumption (financed by capital) and abatement starts. Due to constant
returns to abatement it is possible to reduce pollution completely. Depending on the
elasticities, pollution drops immediately to zero or shrinks smoothly. The effects on
the turning point are illustrated in Table 2. The determinants of the turning point
rely on the elasticities of the model. Depending on the elasticities, the impacts of
the determinants varies in direction or cannot be derived analytically. Hence, it is
impossible to provide general statements about the determinants.
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The second model is a simplification of the threshold idea. In the reduced form
learning by doing is expressed as increasing returns to scale in abatement. At first
I present the idea of IRS in abatement as the cause for the EKC in a static frame.
Thereupon, the idea is developed towards a dynamic model. Two externalities are
included: a negative externality in gross pollution caused by other people and a pos-
itive in abatement efforts caused by learning by abating. The technological progress
leads to IRS in abatement. The results remain the same as in the static case, IRS
in abatement are the only requirement for creating the EKC. Environmental policy is
not necessary for the existence of the EKC, however, it does influence the magnitude
of the EKC. The internalisation of the external effects lowers the pollution level at
the turning point. Hence, regulation cannot be rejected as irrelevant as proposed by
several scholars.
The determinants of the turning point are shown in Table 4. It occurs that the
determinants have the same sign as those of Chapter 4 if the elasticities of both
models are the same. Then an increase of the factor productivity shifts the turning
point towards a higher level of income and also to a higher pollution level. The same
happens if the output elasticity of the external effect on gross pollution rises. An
increase in the strength of abatement, a stronger impact of pollution on utility and a
higher time preference shifts the turning point towards a lower level. The depreciation
rate does not have an impact at all. However, as suggested by the threshold approach,
the results may vary widely with other elasticities of consumption and pollution. Thus,
the results here should not be taken as universally valid.
After that follows a comparison of the models. There it is shown that both models
are in line with empirical regularities other than the EKC hypothesis. Both satisfy
the findings of declining emission intensities and constant expenditures for abatement
relative to GDP. Additionally, the models as augmented AK models are compatible
with most of the Kaldor facts. Moreover, there is empirical evidence for IRS in
abatement. This supports the IRS-model directly and the threshold model indirectly.
Also the idea of learning by abating receives confirmation.
With small adjustments, both approaches are able to produce an N-shaped PIR, an
often found variation of the EKC for local air pollutants. In the Kindergarten model,
the modification is such that maximal abatement cannot eliminate pollution com-
pletely but reduces it close to zero. Then pollution increases after the turning point
on a lower level than before. In the IRS model, the implementation of environmental
regulation implies a shift downwards of the EKC. If the introduction happens before
the turning point of the regulated economy is reached, pollution increases. In this
case the IRS model actually proposes an M-shaped PIR as at the regulated stage
pollution will decline again due to IRS in abatement. However, the idea of IRS in
abatement faces theoretical problems of negative pollution in the long run. This is
problematic because illogical predictions in the long run undermine the general validity
of the whole model. Therefore, fading IRS in abatement are presented as a possible
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solution. The EKC can still arise from this change. Nevertheless, further research
needs to be done into that direction in order to develop the idea of fading IRS in
abatement.
It has been shown in a theoretical approach that learning by doing in abatement is
a reasonable explanation of the EKC. However, it would go too far to conclude that
the EKC is a perfect symbol for sustainable growth. For this, too many doubts are
not yet dispelled. First of all, the EKC has only been tested for pollutants for which
data is available. Hence, many other dimensions of pollution without proper data are
excluded and thus for them the EKC has not been proven. Moreover, the EKC has
been confirmed for a few short living pollutants only. For CO2, the key measure for
the climate change (Nordhaus, 1991), the PIR is rather monotonically increasing. But
if the climate change does not exhibit an inverted-U shaped PIR, economic growth
continues to pollute.
Furthermore, the models do not reject the possibility of pollutant substitution since
they only explain the EKC for single substances. The abatement process often re-
places one substance by another. Therefore, abating one pollutant could actually
imply the boost of a different one. Especially the contrasting results for short living
and long living air pollutants supports this hypothesis. But if abatement exchanges
only the substances instead of eliminating them, economic growth creates pollution
continuously despite the abatement efforts. This clearly contradicts the definition of
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A Appendix
In the appendix I would like to add several calculations of the main part which I did
not discuss in detail in the main text.
A.1 Optimal Control Theory
At first, I want to introduce optimal control theory. In my notations I follow Novales





f (xt, vt, t) dt
with the constraint condition
x˙t = h (xt, vt, t)
and initial value x0 given. Then we can call vt the control variable and xt the state
variable. The constraint describes the evolution of the state variable with respect to
time. Hence, for each value of the control variable at any time, the constraint evolves
differently.
We can solve this problem through its Hamiltonian
H(xt, vt, µt, t) = f(xt, vt, t) + µth(xt, vt, t),
where µt is the co-state variable representing the shadow price of the control variable
or the marginal value of one additional unit of the co-state variable at time t in utility
units at time 0.
In order to solve the maximisation of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state variable
we have to apply Pontryagin’s principle. This includes three optimality conditions:









2. the co-state equation
µ˙t = −∂H
∂xt






and 3. the transversality condition. The transversality condition is necessary as often
in economic applications the state variable (e.g. the capital stock) x(T ) = xT is
restricted in sign. Then, the transversality condition requires that
xT ≥ 0, xTµT = 0
hold. This implies that either xT = 0 or µT = 0. In case xT is not restricted,
the transversality condition is µT = 0. For the infinite horizon, the transversality
condition of the planning problem is
lim
T→∞
xT ≥ 0, lim
T→∞
xTµT = 0





A.2 First-Order Linear Differential Equations
This subsection deals with different first-order differential equations which appear in
the models. The explanations are based on Chapter 15 of Chiang and Wainwright
(2005).
A.2.1 Homogeneous Case with Constant Coefficient


















= lnλt + c1,
where c1 is a constant term. The right hand side yields
−
∫
gdt = −gt+ c2,
where c2 is another constant term. Combining those, we find that
ln λt = −gt+
≡ζ︷ ︸︸ ︷
c2 − c1
where I merge the constant terms as ζ. Next, I take the antilog of ln λt, i.e. I use
the e-function on both sides such that
elnλt = λt = e−gt+ζ
⇒ λt = e−gt eζ︸︷︷︸
≡λ0
⇒ λt = λ0e−gt.
Note that ζ is a constant and therefore eζ is a constant too. Thus, we can rewrite
eζ simply as the constant λ0. This gives us the solution equal to (47).











Plugging this into (41) gives us:
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− δ − ρ
]}
⇔ λ˙ = −gλ
We can see that also for S0 and γ > 1, we have the homogeneous case for λt. Hence,
we can solve this as above such that:
λ˙ = −gλ ⇔ λt = λ0e−gt.
This is the result of (60).
A.2.2 Non-Homogeneous Case with Constant Coefficient and Constant
Term
For S− with γ = 1, the differential equation of the shadow price is slightly different:
λ˙ = −λ(A− δ − ρ) + Az,
where Az is constant. Hence, we have a non-homogeneous linear differential equation
for S−.
The reduced equation refers to the homogeneous part.
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To receive the reduced equation, we can set the non-homogenous part to zero such
that Az = 0. Then
λ˙ = −λ(A− δ − ρ).
This we can solve as described in Appendix A.2.1 such that
λ˙ = −λ(A− δ − ρ) ⇔ λc = λ0e−(A−δ−ρ)t.
In order to get the particular integral, we can assume that λ is a constant, hence we
can set λ˙ = 0. Solving for λ gives then
λp = Az
A− δ − ρ.
The general solution for λt is the sum of the complementary function and the partic-
ular integral:
λt = λc + λp = λ0e−(A−δ−ρ)t +
Az
A− δ − ρ.
This is the result of the differential equation given in (54).
A.2.3 Non-Homogeneous Case with Variable Term
Here I explain the solutions for the non-homogeneous linear differential equations with
variable terms. First, a short introduction to exact differential equations is needed in
order to solve the differential equations discussed afterwards.
A.2.3.1 Exact Differential Equations In order to derive the non-homogeneous
differential equations with variable term, I want to introduce first the concept of exact
differential equations. If we have a function of two variables F (y, t), the corresponding
total differential is






If this is set equal to zero, the resulting differential equation can be called exact since





such that the differential is












Finally, as the exact differential equation is
dF (y, t) = 0,
its general solution is constant such that
F (y, t) = c
where c is a constant term.
A.2.3.2 Solution for S+ and γ = 1 Let us start with the case of S+ and γ = 1.
The differential equation for Kt derived from (34) is
K˙ = dKdt = [A(1− θ
K)− δ]Kt − Ct = (g + ρ)Kt − Ct.
This we can rewrite as
dK + [−(g + ρ)Kt + Ct]dt = 0,
which is an exact differential equation. To assure that this differential is indeed exact,




dK + It[−(g + ρ)Kt + Ct]︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
dt = 0.
Yet, the integrating factor is unknown. Hence, first we must define It such that
the differential equation to be solved is exact. For this, I define M ≡ It and N ≡























= −(g + ρ)
⇔ It = I0e−(g+ρ)t,
where we can set I0 = 1 as it is constant. Therefore, the integrating factor is
It = e−(g+ρ)t.
Replacing It in the differential equation, we get
e−(g+ρ)tdK + e−(g+ρ)t[−(g + ρ)Kt + Ct]dt = 0
which can be solved in four steps. In step I, we write the preliminary result as
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= KtIt + φ(t)
= Kte−(g+ρ)t + φ(t)
In step II, we remember that due to exactness, ∂F
∂t
= N must hold. Therefore, we
can set them equal and find:
∂F
∂t
= Kt[−(g + ρ)]e−(g+ρ)t + φ′(t) = e−(g+ρ)t[−(g + ρ)Kt + Ct] = N
⇔ Kt[−(g + ρ)]e−(g+ρ)t + φ′(t) = −e−(g+ρ)t(g + ρ)Kt + e−(g+ρ)tCt
⇔ φ′(t) = +e−(g+ρ)tCt.
Knowing φ′(t), we can proceed to step III, which is integrating φ′(t) with respect to









Finally, in step IV we plug φ(t) into F (K, t) to get its complete form:






















Since we know from (38) that C = λ−
1
ε
t and from (47) that λt = λ0e−gt, we can
insert those into Kt. Furthermore, we can define that c ≡ K0 since c is constant.
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A.2.3.3 Solution for S− and γ = 1 In this case we know from (34) that for
θ = 0 the differential equation is
K˙ = (A− δ)Kt − Ct
⇔ dK + [−(A− δ)Kt + Ct]dt = 0.
Adding the integrating factor It on both sides gives
It︸︷︷︸
M
dK + It[−(A− δ)Kt + Ct]︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
dt = 0.




, hence we have
∂M
∂t








⇔ It = I0︸︷︷︸
≡1
e−(A−δ)t = e−(A−δ)t.
Hence, the differential equation is
e−(A−δ)tdK + e−(A−δ)t[−(A− δ)Kt + Ct]dt = 0.
Using again the four steps for solving, we obtain from step I
F (K, t) =
∫
ItdK + φ(t) = Kte−(A−δ)t + φ(t).




= Kt[−(A− δ)]e−(A−δ)t + φ′(t) = e−(A−δ)t[−(A− δ)Kt + Ct] = N
⇔ Kt[−(A− δ)]e−(A−δ)t + φ′(t) = −e−(A−δ)t(A− δ)Kt + e−(A−δ)tCt
⇔ φ′(t) = +e−(A−δ)tCt.
as ∂F
∂t









plugging φ(t) into F (K, t) we obtain the complete form of the differential equation





Again, the general solution of the exact differential equation is equal to a constant
















Since we know from (38) that Ct = λ
− 1
ε
t and from (54) that λt = λ0e−(A−δ−ρ)t +
Az








































This result is the same as (55).
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A.2.3.4 Solution for S0 and γ > 1 Finally I want to solve the differential
equation of capital in the case of S0 and γ > 1, which is





























, hence we have
∂M
∂t







= −(g + ρ)
⇔ It = I0︸︷︷︸
≡1
e−(g+ρ)t = e−(g+ρ)t.
Hence, the differential equation is
e−(g+ρ)tdK + e−(g+ρ)t[−(g + ρ)Kt + Ct]dt = 0.
Using again the four steps for solving, we obtain from step I
F (K, t) =
∫
ItdK + φ(t) = Kte−(g+ρ)t + φ(t).
From step II, we receive
∂F
∂t
= Kt[−(g + ρ)]e−(g+ρ)t + φ′(t) = e−(g+ρ)t[−(g + ρ)Kt −Dλ
1
γ−1
t + Ct] = N



























plugging φ(t) into F (K, t) we obtain the complete form of the differential equation











Again, the general solution of the exact differential equation is equal to a constant




























Since we know from (38) that Ct = λ
− 1
ε
t and from (60) that λt = λ0e−gt, the solution









































This result is the same as in (61).
A.3 The Use of the Transversality Condition in the Kinder-
garten Model
To describe the behaviour of the model for t approaching infinity, one can take advan-
tage of the transversality condition (TVC). In the case of γ = 1 of the Kindergarten
Model, this is done in order to prove that the system remains in S+ once it has





Furthermore, from (47) we know that
λt = λ0e−gt






















































































⇔ λ0 = [K0h]−ε




The shadow price develops according to (60) as
λt = λ0e−gt,
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A.4 The Derivatives of the Turning Point in the Kindergarten
Model
In Table 2, I illustrate the marginal derivatives ∂Y ∗
∂x
with x ∈ {A, a, z, ρ, δ} in order to
analyse how the parameters in x affect the turning point. The derivations are given
in the following section.
A.4.1 The Results for γ = 1
Let us start with the case of γ = 1 such that the turning point is as in (67) defined
by





























































since θK = 1
a
and a > 1. The first term in brackets
is positive, and so is the squared denominator. Hence, the sign depends only on













































From here we can see that ∂Y ∗
∂A





. This we can rewrite
such that the derivative is positive as long as
ερ > δε+ ρε− δ − ρ
1 > δε− δ − ρ
⇔ ε < δ + ρ
δ
.
Otherwise the derivative is negative. Hence, for ε 6= 1 the impact of A on the turning
point depends on the parameters.




































Again, the denominator is positive since it is squared. Since ∂g
∂a
= A
a2 , the sign of the
derivation depends again only on (1− 1
ε
). So, for ε ≥ 1 both the first and the second
term of the numerator are smaller than zero such that the derivative is smaller than
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zero, too. For ε < 1, the opposite is true: Because of 1 < 1
ε
, both terms of the
numerator become positive and so does the derivative.














For ε ≥ 1, the sign of the derivative is negative. However, for ε < 1 the result is





is larger or smaller than ρ, the sign is negative or





+ ρ must be

























The denominator is positive because it is squared. Due to ∂g
∂ρ
= −1, the derivative
















Thus, regardless the value of ε the derivative is always smaller than zero.




















where the denominator is always positive due to the square. ∂g
∂δ
= −1 eliminates
the minus in the numerator. Hence, the sign depends only on the term (1 − 1
ε
). If
ε > 1, the derivative of K∗ with respect to δ is larger than zero, if ε < 1 is given,
the opposite holds. For ε = 1, the derivative is zero.
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A.4.2 The Results for γ > 1
Next, let us consider the case of γ > 1. Here we know from (71) that





























































































It can be shown that the sign of this derivation depends on the values of the parame-
ters. For this, remember that since α2 is assumed to be positive, all terms in the first
three rows are positive. Then, the all terms but the very last division is positive. The
sign of the last term however depends on the values of the parameters. To see this,
consider the division of the last row. The denominator is positive due to the squared


























)− δ − ρ
)













γ−1(−1)(δ + ρ) + ρ
]
From the term in the square brackets it is obvious that the sign depends on the values































































Because of this and due to assumption that α2 must be positive, the first two rows
are positive. The partial derivative of D with respect to a is
∂D
∂a












Since the sign of ∂D
∂a
depends on the parameters, a conclusion for ∂Y ∗
∂a
cannot be
given. Thus, the effect of a on Y ∗ remains unclear for any ε.











































For ε ≥ 1 each row is positive such that the derivative has a positive sign. For
ε < 1 however, the first row becomes unclear due to the ambiguity of α2. But since
α2 = h is assumed to be larger than zero to allow for sustainable growth, the first
row remains positive also for ε < 1. Hence, ∂Y ∗
∂z
is positive for any ε.
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= −1. The first row of ∂Y ∗
∂ρ
is always positive. However, the total result
is unclear as it is unclear whether the second term in curly brackets is positive or
negative due to the subtraction. Therefore, no conclusion can be drawn regarding
the sign of the derivative for any ε.











































As in the case of ρ, the first line is always positive but due to the subtraction in the
second curly brackets, the derivation is unclear regarding its sign. No result can be
given for any ε 6= 1.
For ε = 1, we know that α2 = ρ and hence, we know also that ∂α2∂δ = 0. Then, the


















γ−1 Dα−2a (−1)∂α1∂δ > 0.
Since ∂α1
∂δ
= −1 still holds, the derivative with respect to δ is positive for ε = 1.
A.5 The Turning point of the IRS Model
In Chapter 5, I derived the turning point with respect to time (119) and income (120)
from the pollution time path and the PIR respectively. The calculations are given
here. Let us start with the pollution time path.
First, consider the pollution function of (102)
Pˆ (C,E) = C − CαEβ+η,
and the FOC with respect to C (105) and E (106):
C = α
λ
E = β + η
λ
Combining these gives










Using the definition of λt from (114)
λt =
α + β + η
K0ρ
e−(A−δ−ρ)t,
we can rewrite the pollution function such that it is only depending on t:
P˜ (t) = αρK0




α + β + η
)α ((β + η) ρK0




This is pollution time path discussed in (115). Deriving this with respect to t gives









α + β + η
)α ((β + η) ρK0
α + β + η
)β+η
(A− δ − ρ)(α + β + η)e(A−δ−ρ)t(α+β+η) = 0.
This can be rewritten as:
K0αρ




α + β + η
)α+β+η
αα(β + η)(β+η)(α + β + η)e(A−δ−ρ)(α+β+η)t
⇔ (K0)1−α−β−ηα1−α(β + η)−(β+η)(α + β + η)α+β+η−2ρ1−α−β−η = e(A−δ−ρ)(α+β+η−1)t
⇔ ln
[
(K0ρ)1−α−β−ηα1−α(β + η)−(β+η)(α + β + η)α+β+η−2
]
= (A− δ − ρ)(α + β + η − 1)t





(A− δ − ρ)(α + β + η) .
In order to get the turning point with respect to income, recall the pollution function
(102)
Pˆ (C,E) = C − CαEβ+η,
and the definition of the consumption rate c ≡ C
Y
and of the environmental effort
rate b ≡ E
Y
. Combining those gives us the PIR as in (116):
P ∗(Y ) = cY − (cY )α (bY )β+η .





= c− α(cY )α−1 (bY )β+η − (β + η)(cY )α(bY )β+η = 0
⇔ c = cαbβ+η(α + β + η)Y α+β+η−1
⇔ Y α+β+η−1 = c1−αb−(β+η)(α + β + η)−1
⇔ Y α+β+η−1 =
[
αρ
A(α + β + η)
]1−α [ (β + η)ρ
A(α + β + η)
]−(β+η)
(α + β + η)−1





α1−α(β + η)−(β+η)(α + β + η)α+β+η−2
⇔ Y ∗ = Aα
1−α
α+β+η−1 (β + η)−
β+η




A.6 Comparative Statics of the IRS Model
In Table 3, the comparative statics of the turning point in the IRS model are presented.
Here, I provide the derivations for A, ρ, α, β and η. For simplicity, let us define






= 1. Recall the turning
point with respect to income from (120). This we can rewrite as
























































eln[α] 1−ασ−1 ( 1
α
1− α
σ − 1 + ln[α]













σ−1 ln[β + η]
(β + η) ∂σ
∂α















σ − 1 + ln[σ]
(σ − 1) ∂σ
∂α





















σ − 1 +
−σ + α
(σ − 1)2 ln[α]







(1− α)(σ − 1)σ + (σ − 2)(σ − 1)α
+ ln[α](−1)(
β+η︷ ︸︸ ︷










(σ − 1)(−α + β + η) + ασ (ln[σ] + (β + η) ln[β + η]− ln[α])
.
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σ − 1 + ln[β + η]
















σ − 1 + ln[σ]
(σ − 1)∂σ
∂β














ln[α]−(1− α)(σ − 1)2 + −1σ − 1
+ ln[β + η]−(σ − 1) + (β + η)(σ − 1)2 +
σ − 2








− ln[α](1− α)σ − σ(σ − 1)
+σ ln[β + η](
1−α︷ ︸︸ ︷






σ ln[σ]− 2σ + 2 + σ(α− 1)
(












ln[α]− ln[β + η]
)]
.
